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ABSTRACT 
The struggles for racial equality throughout northern cities during the late-
1960s, while not nearly as prevalent within historical scholarship as those 
pertaining to the Deep South, have left an indelible mark on both the individuals and 
communities involved.  Historians have until recently thought of the civil rights 
movement in the north as a violent betrayal of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s vision of 
an inclusive and integrated society, as well as coinciding with the rise, and 
subsequent decline, of Black Power.  But despite such suppositions, the experiences 
of northern cities immersed in the civil rights struggle were far more varied and 
nuanced.   
The explosion of racial violence throughout American cities in the late-1960s 
bred fear among many in the white political establishment who viewed the cultural 
shifts inherent in racial equality as threatening to undermine their traditional racial 
dominance.  Partially the result of feelings of increased powerlessness, and partially 
in an effort of self-preservation, many in the ranks of government and law 
enforcement worked to oppose the seismic changes underfoot. This thesis makes a 
concerted effort to examine and evaluate the role that race played in the Albina 
community of Portland, Oregon in the late-1960s, with a particular emphasis on the 
motivations, impact, and legacy of two racial disturbances that occurred there in the 
summers of 1967 and 1969.  It asserts that while racial prejudice and bigotry were 
certainly prevalent among members of both the city’s political and law enforcement 
community, and did play a significant role in the deterioration of their relationship 
with the black community, there were many other factors that also contributed to 
 ii 
the police-community discord in late-1960s Albina.  Moreover, it asserts that the 
reactions of the white and African-American communities to the disturbances were, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, not monolithic, but rather diverse and wide-
ranging.  
The goal of this narrative history is not merely to analyze the racial unrest 
and public response to the disturbances, but also to integrate and link the 
experiences of Portland’s African-Americans into the broader dialogue of the civil 
rights movement of the late-1960s.  In short, the study of late-1960s Portland allows 
us to reach a greater understanding of racial inequality in America during this 
period.   
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1 
Introduction 
 
 On May 24, 1969, a nineteen-year-old African-American named Percy Hampton 
was arrested at the intersection of N.E. Going Street and Cleveland Avenue, in the 
northeast section of Portland, Oregon, on charges of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, 
and assault.  A young leader within Portland’s black community, Hampton had been at 
home only a couple blocks away from the intersection moments earlier when, after a 
commotion outside, a neighbor running by the house told him that his younger brother 
was being beaten by local police officers.  As he sprinted to the intersection in an effort to 
come to his brother’s aid, Hampton was ordered to “stop” by two policemen shouting 
behind him.  Responding that it was his brother that was being assaulted by the officers, 
Hampton refused the directive and moved closer towards the altercation until a nearby 
police car intercepted him.
1
  What occurred next is disputed.   
According to Hampton, four police officers, without provocation, jumped out of 
the police car and pinned him against a nearby wall. Cuffing and kicking him, they threw 
him into the patrol car and arrested him.
2
  The narrative of the same altercation by 
Portland police, however, differed greatly.  Disputing the assertion that any use of force 
had been unprovoked, the police stated that Hampton had become “abusive” shortly after 
they had confronted him, and that a crowd of nearly one-hundred and fifty individuals, 
many of whom were spitting and striking the police as the arrest proceeded, had created 
an overtly hostile atmosphere.
3
   
 
 
2 
As Hampton recounted that year, the episode of May 1969 served as the first of 
three altercations he eventually had with Portland police over the course of three weeks, 
with each arrest preceded by physical abuse.
4
  Clashes between members of the city’s 
African-American community and the police, while certainly not routine, had become 
much more frequent by the time of Hampton’s initial encounter.  Although many issues 
such as low-quality and overcrowded housing, soaring unemployment, poverty, and de 
facto segregation had been prevalent in the black community throughout the 1960s, the 
gradual erosion of police – community relations in Portland’s predominantly black 
Albina neighborhood posed the greatest threat to racial harmony within the city.
5
  Many 
of these concerns undoubtedly were part of the larger social and cultural context of the 
1960s.  Yet incidents such as those experienced by younger, militant, and more vocal 
members of Portland’s black community like Hampton reflected components and aspects 
that seemed uniquely related to the Rose City’s own experience with race relations.   
By the late 1960s, the geographical boundaries of Albina had become relatively 
static.  Covering an area of just over four square miles, the area’s boundaries reached as 
far north as N.E. Columbia Boulevard and as far south as Interstate 84, even though most 
of the Black Community lived between Fremont Avenue on the south and Killingsworth 
Avenue on the north.  Additionally, while the heart of Albina was centered between 
Mississippi Avenue on the west and N.E. 15
th
 Avenue on the east, the boundaries of the 
neighborhood extended further in each direction to cover families and communities 
unable to find housing in the more settled neighborhoods.  Union Avenue, running north 
 
 
3 
and south, ran straight through the King neighborhood, which, along with the Boise and 
Humboldt neighborhoods, had become the heart of the area.
6
  
Portland was the second most segregated city of the six major urban areas located 
along the West Coast.
7
   While African-Americans totaled only 2 percent of the city’s 
population in 1960, 80 percent lived in the Albina neighborhood.
8
  As a result of this 
racial disparity, black representation in city government and civic institutions was nearly 
non-existent.
9
  Racial strife also strained the delicate accommodation built up throughout 
the 1950s between Portland’s “Old Guard” African-Americans and their white 
counterparts.  Because the number of Portland’s black citizens was so small, most white 
politicians had little incentive to acknowledge that problems of race and inequality 
existed in the Albina district, and seemed only capable of working to find tangible 
solutions to the area’s problems when activists propelled them and in rare cases when 
election politics necessitated it.  In fact, a 1957 City Club of Portland report on race 
suggested that city politicians and prominent business owners continued to deny that 
racism existed in the city.   
The reluctance to advocate for racial progress and acknowledge the demands of 
local civil rights organizations also found repeated support in the local press.  In cases 
like the argument between Percy Hampton and the police, the journalistic line of 
responsibility was often muddied in a narrative reporting of events that relied exclusively 
on local police reports.  While not overtly discriminatory, journalism of this kind 
continued to perpetuate already existing fallacies concerning Portland’s black population 
and more specifically, the Albina area’s more radical and militant members.  In 
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particular, such reporting continually and often purposefully distorted the nature of 
altercations between the police and the African-American community.  
 Racism had a long history in Oregon.  The state’s first constitution, written in 
1859, enacted exclusion laws that prohibited blacks from living or owning property 
within its borders and perpetuated the mentality that Oregon would be explicitly 
inhabited and governed by whites.  While free blacks challenged such laws, such as the 
seventy-five men who came to Portland by rail in 1883 to work at the Portland Hotel, it 
was not until 1926 that the most prejudiced and anti-black portions of the constitution 
were officially repealed.
10
  In the years prior to World War I, the vast majority of 
Portland’s small African-American community lived near Union Station, with many 
exclusively black-owned businesses thriving along the northwest stretch of Broadway 
Avenue.  With the construction of the Broadway Bridge in the early twentieth century, 
however, some African-Americans moved across the river to northeast Portland, bringing 
their businesses with them. Despite relative economic success for many blacks, racial 
discrimination still thrived throughout much of the city.  While there were no segregated 
buses, restrooms, or drinking fountains, nearly all of Portland’s schools, hospitals, and 
restaurants refused to cater to black patrons.  The African-American right to vote, a sign 
of freedom that would not reach most blacks in the South until 1965, did little for civic 
progress in an overwhelmingly white city and state.  Such a numerical disparity in the 
race of voters, as well as the polarized ethnic, religious, and racial ideology of the time, 
contributed to the 1922 election of Ku Klux Klan backed candidates for the offices of 
Portland Mayor, Chief of Police, County Sheriff, and Governor. 
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 During the Great Depression of the 1930s, African-American waiters, elevator 
operators, and busboys found themselves squeezed out of jobs to make room for white 
employees who had refused such positions only years earlier.  As a result, most black 
men were forced into positions as Pullman porters or janitors, while most black women 
took posts in domestic housework.  Meanwhile, Portland’s exclusively white Realty 
Board and local politicians began moving blacks away from the downtown area into the 
Albina district across the river. 
 Written into the Code of Ethics of Portland Realtors, Article 34 stated that 
Portland realtors would never sell property within the city to members of any race or 
nationality whose presence would hurt property values.  Encompassing groups such as 
African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Jews, Article 34 allowed white realtors to 
funnel minority populations into the area between “Oregon Street and Russell, and 
between Union and the River.” The code separated the cheap real estate and run-down 
housing of the Albina District from neighborhoods with higher property values reserved 
for future white buyers.
11
  Openly perpetuated by Portland’s real estate agents, banks, and 
city authorities, “redlining” played a devastating role in creating not only the 
demographics of what came to be referred to as Albina, but contributed to many of the 
problems that continued to plague the District through the 1960s. 
 The growth in Portland’s African-American population can be linked to 
America’s entry into World War II.  As a major port with easy Columbia River access to 
the Pacific Ocean, the Portland-Vancouver area hosted three Kaiser shipyards to outfit 
the Pacific theatre.  Responding to the demand for workers, nearly twenty-five thousand 
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African-Americans from all over the country, as well as nearly one hundred thousand 
whites, hopped on railroad trains and made their way to the Pacific Northwest.  Assigned 
to the federally constructed public housing of Vanport City, so named because of its 
geographical location mid-way between Vancouver, Washington, and Portland, nearly 
forty thousand residents, forty percent of them African-American, joined the the second 
largest wartime city in Oregon.  
As shipyard production drastically reduced at war’s end, unemployment spiked 
among the city’s former war workers.  African-Americans were particularly hard hit.  
Finding employment in a place listed in 1945 as the “most discriminatory city north of 
the Mason-Dixon Line” by The Social Worker’s Journal, was nearly impossible.
12
  
Fifteen thousand African-Americans returned home to the southern and eastern states.  
Many of those who remained lost their places of residence in the Vanport Flood of 1948.  
Restricted from buying homes in most areas of the city, a perceived threat, as Mayor Earl 
Riley described it to Portland’s “regular way of life,” nearly all the blacks forced out of 
Vanport found themselves concentrated in the overcrowded Albina District.  As more 
African-Americans moved into the area from temporary housing in Vanport, large 
numbers of whites left for the suburbs.
13
  Throughout the 1950s, Albina lost one third of 
its total population; and by the end of the decade, had 23,00 fewer whites and 7,300 more 
blacks.
14
  With the passing of Oregon’s Fair Housing Law in 1957, moreover, many 
affluent African-Americans fled to the suburbs or other residential areas, leaving less 
fortunate neighbors behind.   
 
 
7 
By the mid-1950s, Portland city officials had targeted the area for urban renewal 
designed to meet the problems of encroaching blight.  During the war, Williams Avenue, 
which ran through the heart of the black community, had served as the hub of African-
American nightlife with jazz clubs and bars that attracted music luminaries such as Duke 
Ellington and Ella Fitzgerald.
15
  Albina businesses as diverse as clothing shops, nurseries, 
and restaurants continued to flourish through much of the 1950s.  Yet construction efforts 
on Interstate-5, which would run primarily through the Eliot neighborhood in lower 
Albina, diverted traffic away from many of these businesses, causing many to close 
down.  Other urban renewal projects such as the construction of Memorial Coliseum and 
the subsequent erection of Emanuel Hospital had a profound impact on the area.  
Between the two projects alone, roughly four hundred homes and businesses were 
displaced, leading to an exodus of businesses east to Union Avenue.   
Urban renewal ultimately led to the loss of nearly 1,100 housing units and over 
three hundred businesses.  The result, one scholar has suggested, “brutally disrupted 
various aspects of residents’ lives: economic, social, psychological, and spiritual.”
16
  
“The emergence of the black ghetto did not happen as a chance by-product of other 
socioeconomic processes,” wrote Douglas Massey and Nancy J. Denton in American 
Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (1993).  “Rather, white 
Americans made a series of deliberate decisions to deny blacks access to urban housing 
markets and to reinforce spatial segregation.”  In short, concluded Massey and Denton, 
the structure of the black ghetto did not lend itself to permanence, but rather to the 
actions and inactions of the white political establishment.
17
 
 
 
8 
Because bankers and speculators often discouraged investment in Albina-area 
residences, housing stock had seriously deteriorated by the 1960s.  Although many 
residents found employment as either clerical or service workers in the public sector, 
moreover, unemployment remained much higher among blacks than their white 
counterparts, while salaries for African-Americans were often lower than those for white 
employees.  Albina public schooling also suffered.  Because of the massive concentration 
of African-Americans living in the area, public education experienced a severe case of de 
facto segregation.  A mere nine of Portland’s ninety-four public schools, consequently, 
were tasked with the education of most of the city’s black students.  Citing poor 
graduation rates among the city’s black public school students in comparison to white 
counterparts, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
accused Portland Public Schools in 1962 of passively allowing segregated schooling.  
Follow-up reports by PPS tasked with investigating such accusations found that racial 
disparities did, in fact, prevail in city schools.  Yet while the Portland School Board 
acknowledged that segregation existed, it refused to admit any inequality in the standard 
of education, choosing instead to blame poor black student scores and performances on 
cultural deficiencies.   
By the mid-1960s, increasing numbers of Albina residents had become impatient 
with establishment temporizing in matters of racial justice and became more aggressive 
in demanding social equality.  While the non-violent and integrationist civil rights 
movement in the South, led by leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr., Bob Moses, and 
John Lewis, and organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Coalition 
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(SCLC), Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), had yielded significant gains such as the federal Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the lingering presence of more 
subtle and covert forms of racism and inequality in the North had become a major issue 
of contention.  Advocates for a more militant form of black activism such as Malcolm X 
saw folly in the strategy of the moderate and non-violent rights organizations.  Arguing 
that civil and human rights were bestowed upon men by God at birth, rather than by the 
white politicians composing the statehouses and the halls of Congress, Malcolm X urged 
African-Americans to abandon the passivity of the non-violent movement in favor of a 
more assertive approach.  This strategy, soon adapted by activists such as Stokely 
Carmichael, created a schism in the movement.  A former follower of King, Carmichael 
referred to racial integration as “an insidious subterfuge for white supremacy” and 
rejected non-violence as a mere accommodation. Sensing the changing political 
landscape brought about by the emergence of a black populace displeased with the 
stagnation of the movement, leaders such as Carmichael sought to eradicate the passivity 
of previous generations by coining the phrase “Black Power.”
18
 
 The formation of the Black Panther Party for Self Defense (BPP), founded in 
1966 by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale, two community college students from 
Oakland, California, officially brought the concept of Black Power to a national 
audience.  Envisioning the organization as a way for the black community to defend itself 
against an Oakland Police Department that was seen as racist and physically threatening, 
Newton and Seale depicted the BPP as a mechanism to provide the poor and 
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underprivileged in their community with access to basic social services that local 
government failed to provide.  This particular aspect of the organization, while a driving 
principle in its founding, tended to be overshadowed by the more radical demands of the 
group’s Ten Point Plan, as well as its militant and imposing persona.
19
 
 In Portland, exposure to groups advocating Black Power was limited.  Prior to the 
1960s, the only black advocacy organizations in the city had been the NAACP and the 
Urban League, both nonviolent and reformist in philosophy.  In 1961, however, a Black 
Muslim named Clarence Debiew, otherwise known as “Charles CX”, opened a mosque 
on Williams Avenue, with the interest of introducing the Portland area to the black 
nationalist ideology of the Nation of Islam, founded by Elijah Muhammad.  After 
persistent harassment by numerous residents, as well as a lack of support from much of 
the city, Debiew and his wife eventually left town, leaving behind their mosque and a 
small group of adherents.  Yet by the late 1960s, many African-Americans in Portland 
had become much more accepting of a more militant approach including racial change 
through “any means necessary.”  By this time, local historian Darrell Millner has 
suggested, young African-American children of the shipyard workers had endured 
enough “and came of age as the Civil Rights Movement grew more confrontational.”
20
  
 While there has been an extensive amount written on the African-American 
experience in Portland’s Albina District, until Leanne Serbulo and Karen J. Gibson’s 
2013 Oregon Historical Quarterly article, “Black and Blue: Police-Community Relations 
in Portland’s Albina District, 1964-1985,” very little scholarship on the topic had focused 
on the antagonistic relationship between the police and community in the late-1960s and 
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the subsequent troubles that arose as a result of it.  While only briefly mentioning the 
disturbances of 1967, Serbulo and Gibson meticulously detail both the ineffectual 
behavior of city politicians to create greater racial equality and overt efforts by many in 
city law enforcement to harass and alienate black residents while prohibiting civil rights 
gains.  Providing unambiguous accounts of police surveillance efforts, institutionalized 
racial discrimination, and a lack of leadership from the city’s elected representatives, the 
article was invaluable for providing the context for the fear and paranoia that permeated 
Albina during the late-1960s.  Jules Boykoff and Martha Gies’s article in the Oregon 
Historical Quarterly, “We’re Going to Defend Ourselves: The Portland Chapter of the 
Black Panther Party and the Local Media Response,” while chronicling the genesis of the 
activism of Percy Hampton and Kent Ford, mainly examined the work of the Black 
Panthers in the 1970s and treatment of the Party in Portland’s two largest newspapers.  
“Bleeding Albina: A History of Community Disinvestment, 1940 – 2000,” a journal 
article by Karen J. Gibson, provided extensive research on segregated housing in the city 
and the role of economic disinvestment.  Yet Gibson merely mentioned the disturbances 
of 1967 and 1969 in passing.
21
  Another work, Ethan Johnson and Felicia Williams’s 
“Desegregation and Multiculturalism in the Portland Public Schools” explored the role of 
de facto segregation in precipitating the “large riot on Union Avenue” but left it at that.
22
   
Two books, The History of Albina by Roy E. Roos and History of Portland’s 
African-American Community (1805 to the Present), the latter commissioned by 
Portland’s Bureau of Planning, both contributed necessarily small write-ups on late-
sixties unrest.  Steven Reed Johnson’s article “The Evolution of Civic Activism in the 
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Albina Neighborhood,” included a brief reference to the minor role that the turmoil of 
1967 played in undermining traditional civil rights organizations of the area.
23
   
 This thesis will examine the manner in which Portland’s black and white 
communities, law enforcement officials, city politicians, and local media responded to the 
changing racial dynamics within the civil rights movement of the late 1960s.  
Specifically, it will explore the root causes and motivations behind two separate racial 
disturbances in the Albina neighborhood in the summers of 1967 and 1969, as well as the 
effect these events had on the Albina neighborhood and its residents over subsequent 
years.  The behavior of Portland’s militant blacks, city government officials, and law 
enforcement officers will be scrutinized with the aim of determining to what extent each 
group contributed to the racial turmoil and how truthfully each publicly characterized 
their own role as well as that of their adversaries in these matters.  The thesis also seeks 
to place the Albina disturbances in the context of national race relations in the late 1960s, 
as well as within the context of Oregon’s own long and complicated racial history. 
 The primary sources utilized in this work fall into two categories.  First, 
newspaper accounts of the incidents detailed in this study were invaluable for the day-to-
day reporting of events, as well as for the editorials and op-eds that provided a glimpse 
into the mood and psyche of Portland’s citizens and press.  During the period of time that 
is the focus of this thesis, Portland produced two daily newspapers:  the Oregonian, 
printed each morning, and the Oregon Journal, printed each afternoon.  Additionally, the 
Willamette Bridge, an underground radical newspaper that began weekly circulation in 
1968, served as an avowedly liberal voice on issues of local and national politics, and 
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gave voice to Portland’s small but burgeoning black militants.  Lastly, the Oregon 
Advance-Times and Clarion Defender, both black-owned and operated newspapers 
focused much of their attention on the impact of local issues on African-Americans.  
Advocating for more moderate positions than Willamette Bridge, the Times and the 
Defender served as crucial resources to understanding the cultural attitudes and 
sentiments of Portland’s moderate black citizens.  Collectively, these newspapers 
provided a comprehensive look at the events as they unfolded, and spoke to the various 
groups in Portland who were invested on the account.  In addition, the newspapers 
offered an abundance of key quotes and statements from the principal actors involved in 
many of the incidents, providing a historical record of many events that might otherwise 
have been left undocumented by history. 
 The second category of primary sources utilized in this thesis came from the 
Stanley Parr Archives and Records Center (SPARC) and the Oregon Historical Society 
(OHS).  Included in these documents were a loose collection of internal memorandums, 
city police reports, and correspondence between city politicians and their constituents 
concerning issues of race, city governance, and the conduct of the Police Bureau.  These 
records were invaluable to understanding how the city’s politicians and community 
members viewed and spoke about the racial difficulties the city faced when they felt they 
could speak freely without judgment or public condemnation.  Additionally, the letters 
and sentiments revealed that, contrary to narratives often pushed by local and national 
media outlets, there was not a singular or monolithic way of thinking about the issue of 
race in Portland.  Advocacy or opposition for certain ideas and policies cut across not 
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only the spectrum of age and class, but also race.  Additional primary source material for 
the thesis came in the form of already existing oral interviews that were drawn on 
primarily for background information.   
 The time frame for this study is 1967 - 1969, with particular emphasis on two 
separate disturbances that occurred in late July/early August of 1967 and June of 1969.  
The text is divided up into four substantive chapters.  Chapter One examines the roots 
and motivations behind the initial Albina disturbance in the summer of 1967, while the 
following chapter examines the reactions of Portland’s community to that incident of 
violence and disorder.  Chapter Three focuses on the efforts of both the African-
American community and the city’s government to improve race relations in the wake of 
the disorder, as well as their response to larger national efforts at addressing the problems 
plaguing America’s urban cities.  Chapter Four centers on Albina’s second major 
disturbance, lasting nearly a week in June of 1969, further exacerbating tense race 
relations in the community.  Lastly, a Conclusion will examine the short-and-long term 
effects of the two Albina disturbances on area residents, businesses, schools, and 
community-police relations.  
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Chapter 1: The Disturbances at Irving Park (1967) 
As tensions escalated in the Portland Albina community during the summer of 
1967, Mayor Terry Schrunk received an ominous warning from a self-described resident 
of the district.  News of continued racial disturbances across the country coupled with 
conversations overheard on the bus, wrote Dd Loretta Wooster, had “many people, both 
Negro and White, very much concerned and „scared‟ that this will happen here.”
1
  Urging 
the mayor to utilize his position by appearing on television, where he could remind the 
city of the inter-racial progress Portland had made as a community, Wooster pleaded that 
an intimate talk “could very well throw a tremendous amount of weight in the right scale 
in quelling the fear culminating in a lot of people before it can gain possible riotous 
momentum.”
2
  Although the letter dismissed rioting in other cities as the work of dubious 
agitators, Wooster felt sure that Portland possessed only a few such individuals.  
Nevertheless, she insisted that people needed reassurance until “the wind dies down.”
3
 
 Only a day before Wooster‟s letter arrived at City Hall, a sudden outburst of 
vandalism, initiated predominantly by African-American youths in the Albina district, 
sparked two nights of civil unrest, small scale rioting, and direct, and at times violent, 
confrontations between members of Portland‟s African-American community and the 
Portland Police Department.  Dd Loretta Wooster‟s concerns, while accurate in their 
assessment of the resentment felt by many African-Americans in the district, had 
underestimated the speed with which the neighborhood‟s patience with city officials and 
police officials had disintegrated. 
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In the two months prior to Wooster‟s letter, large-scale race riots had occurred in 
major American cities such as Tampa, Buffalo, Minneapolis, and Newark.  Five days of 
rioting in Detroit, moreover, had left 43 people dead and more than 450 injured, with 
over 7,000 arrests, and more than 2,000 buildings destroyed.  The scale and damage of 
the 1967 Detroit riots, coupled with an overall increase in the levels of racial unrest and 
disorder between blacks and whites in American cities since the Watts Riots in Los 
Angeles two years earlier, prompted President Lyndon B. Johnson to act.  A day after the 
conclusion of rioting in Detroit, and on the same day Dd Loretta Wooster sounded her 
own alarm, Johnson appointed a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, also 
known as the Kerner Commission, to investigate the causes of recent rioting throughout 
the country, and to offer recommendations regarding how to properly address them in the 
future. 
While many urban areas of the country found difficulty achieving racial harmony 
in the summer of 1967, Portland was no different.  Focusing on the contentious 
relationship between a predominantly white Portland Police Department and a 
predominantly black population within the Albina district, the Urban League of Portland 
undertook an Education and Youth Incentives program that year.  The League aimed to 
build on earlier meetings with police to garner improved communications in Albina by 
“formulating a program that will establish positive police-community relations in the core 
area.”
4
  Limited recreational activities for black youth in the area, combined with 
perceived inequalities in treatment by police, had led to growing discontentment with 
their quality of life, and a more fertile atmosphere for a riot, suggested Frank Fair, a local 
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black youth who worked for C-CAP (Church-Community Action Program), the social 
action arm of Portland‟s interracial and predominantly black community. “When you get 
to feeling locked in – that‟s when frustrations start,” Fair explained to the Oregonian 
newspaper.
5
 Robert Nelson, an African-American businessman from Albina, added that 
Portland had all the reasons for a riot, arguing that most local black youths had “a ghetto 
complex.”
6
  An Oregon Journal editorial in July titled, “Newark‟s Message to Portland,” 
drew a comparison between the New Jersey city‟s issues of urban decay, failing city 
schools, and white migration to the suburbs with those in Portland.  The commentary 
pointed to the “weed seeds” of poverty and inequality in the city and stressed that “the 
public authorities who warn that it is far better to act before the city slides downhill, than 
to try to pull it back once it has slipped, are not crying wolf.”
7
  Other citizens, unaffiliated 
with civic groups working at improving race relations but equally concerned about rising 
tensions within the community, also began speaking up.  Writing directly to the mayor in 
late July, a “Portland resident and taxpayer” with the initials “E.H.B.” attached a 
newspaper clipping from an Omaha, Nebraska newspaper describing the positive effect 
of hiring two Negro police officers.  “It might help your already very fine police force if 
there were a few more Negro police here,” the author advised.
8
   
The battle over the necessity and frequency of police presence within Albina 
parks and neighborhoods was at the center of the antagonism between black youth and 
Portland police.  By 1967, local police were consistently surveilling the neighborhood, a 
by-product of the establishment of the Portland Police Intelligence Division.  Devised in 
the mid-1960s to closely monitor neighborhood civil rights activists and agitators, the 
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Intelligence Division was tasked with the collection and dissemination of information on 
civil rights groups they targeted.  Given such oversight, the police monitored those 
Albina residents who were actively involved in the area‟s civil rights movement.   
Such supervision, however, did not go unnoticed by Albina‟s African-American 
residents.  “Where else but in Albina do cops hang around the streets and parks all day 
like plantation overseers?” observed a local resident.  “Just their presence antagonizes us.  
We feel like we‟re being watched all the time.”
9
   Additionally, the Intelligence Division 
was given orders to intervene at any gathering, rally, or event, and to make arrests if such 
situations necessitated it.
10
   While Albina residents charged the police with unwarranted 
surveillance of their neighborhoods solely on the basis of race, police officials responded 
that, in a show of good faith, they had specifically refused to “set up a special force for 
dealing with these areas” in an effort not to alienate the local population.
11
  Reverend 
Paul Schulze, a local pastor, addressed C-CAP on the concerns of local Albina youth 
regarding the role of the police in the area.  Youth in the Fremont and Union area, noted 
Schulze, often congregated under the surveillance of police who continued to pursue a 
policy of containment rather than actual intervention.
12
  A participant in Operation 
Contact, a program aimed at delinquent youth on the streets of Northeast Portland, the 
minister recounted the tenuous dynamics at play between black youths, local police, and 
the news media.  On one occasion, Schulze referred to the indifference of a police officer 
unwilling to get out of his car to break up a violent parking lot fight between two blacks. 
On a separate occasion, the pastor spoke to disappointment about a newspaper article 
about a small conflict that occurred at the conclusion of a youth dance at Irving Park: “A 
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potential riot was there, but most youngsters maintained their cool and did not get 
involved in rampaging property,” he noted.  Yet Schulze complained that the following 
day‟s newspapers treated the event “as a „riotous rumble‟ and consciously or 
unconsciously featured the story in conjunction with riot situations in Cleveland and 
Chicago.”
13
   
Despite mounting signs of resentment between police and much of Portland‟s 
black community, several politicians disputed any possibility of racial violence. Speaking 
to a group of reporters at a late-July news conference, Governor Tom McCall claimed he 
possessed no information that would lead him to believe racial violence similar to that 
occurring throughout the Midwest and East would occur in Oregon.  Citing poor job 
opportunities, troubled schooling, and the presence of an urban ghetto, McCall 
acknowledged that race relations in Oregon were not “perfect.”  Yet he contended that 
the relationship between the state‟s whites and blacks was much better than those in 
many other states.  Nevertheless, the governor explained that a dialogue with the black 
community was necessary.  “We must try to just as hard as Newark and Detroit to right 
these tremendous wrongs,” he concluded.
14
 
  Four days later, McCall again spoke to the topic of racial rioting throughout the 
country, stating that he was concerned regarding “the breakdown in orderly democratic 
process.”  Arguing that rioting would not solve problems and was “alien to America‟s 
institutions,” the governor again cited unemployment, inadequate education, and 
substandard housing as issues that cities and governments must address to nullify the 
increasing levels of discontent and anger in impoverished communities.  McCall said his 
 21 
staff was making every effort “to meet the responsibilities of the state toward correcting 
imbalances.  We are keeping avenues of conversation open.  We are in contact with the 
people and their organizations in the affected groups.”
15
 
Following the palpable increase in tension in the Albina area in the days leading 
up to the disturbance, many community leaders made efforts to defuse the situation.  
Rumors had circulated that a demonstration might occur over the last weekend of July in 
connection with a rally featuring militant Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver at a “Sunday at 
the Park” program.
16
  Promoted by the “Ad Hoc Committee for Black Culture,” the 
program was to feature not only the well-known Ramparts writer and activist, but a Black 
Arts Theatre from San Francisco, a Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 
photo exhibit, and live music.  In the week leading up to the scheduled rally at Albina‟s 
Irving Park, two black ministers, Reverend John H. Jackson, a well-known area pastor 
from Mt. Olivet Baptist Church, and Bishop William McKinney, visited local bars, 
barber shops, and pool halls in an effort to learn as much as possible about the event.  
Working to convince as many of the young male patrons as they could not to participate, 
the two were met with “a cool reception” and were told that they “did not know what kids 
would do today.”
17
  On the Friday of that weekend, when many of the teenagers who 
spoke to the ministers had predicted there might be a riot, a youth dance proceeded in the 
neighborhood without any altercations, leaving many locals to breathe a sigh of relief.   
On July 29
th
, the day before the scheduled rally, the Albina Ministerial 
Association presided over an urgent gathering of local pastors, priests, and ministers.  
The meeting produced an announcement to be read at church services the next morning, 
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urging parents to keep their children off the streets, out of the parks, and away from the 
rally.  Indeed, many of the community‟s pastors used their Sunday pulpits to advise youth 
in attendance to abstain from visiting Irving Park because the likely sponsors of the rally 
were criminals, intent on starting a riot.  Colden Brown, Jr., a young African-American 
from Berkeley, California, who spent the summer of 1967 in Portland teaching Black 
History and Jazz for Reed University‟s Upward Bound program, remembered going to 
church where we heard a letter read to the „flock,‟ telling us to stay away from Irving 
Park,” because a riot would “get a lot of Black people killed and maimed.”
18
 
Despite the efforts of local elders, Irving Park had clearly become a focal point 
for area residents, as well as police, on the morning of July 30th.  Colden Brown, one of 
many Black Power advocates intent on speaking during the “Sunday in the Park” rally, 
saw a potential conflict looming when he emerged from his home that day: “On the way 
to church, we saw the National Guard, in a big show of force.”
19
 Furthermore, Brown‟s 
group of black activists, who intended to use the park in the afternoon for the gathering, 
had not applied for a park permit, and would be in violation of the city ordinance 
requiring one. Citing the city‟s lack of permit enforcement for parks predominantly 
patronized by whites such as Lair Hill, Brown saw a pattern of racism in such 
discrepancies.  “Irving Park is the Black peoples‟ park, just like Lair Hill is for the 
hippies,” he later noted in an opinion piece in Portland State College‟s Vanguard 
newspaper.  “The FBI, police, and National Guard never show up [there].  Because our 
activity was sponsored by blacks for blacks, the city fathers decided that it would need 
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policing.  After all, they seemed to be implying that Black people cannot police 
themselves.”
20
 
By early Sunday afternoon, the day‟s bright and sunny weather had attracted 
nearly one hundred patrons to Irving Park.
21
  In one area of the park baseball games were 
being played, in others, the tennis courts were occupied, and in yet another, children were 
sliding down slides and playing on the equipment.  Other individuals, many of them 
teenagers and young adults, were merely milling around the area in anticipation of the 
afternoon rally and speeches.   Many of the latter, including young black activists such as 
Brown who were frustrated and unhappy with local government and community 
leadership, saw their meeting as an opportunity for local blacks to take matters into their 
own hands, and to protest worsening conditions in their neighborhoods.  Others, knowing 
only of the scheduled appearance of Eldridge Cleaver, were likely composed of both 
Portland residents as well as outsiders who had made the trek exclusively for the rally.  
The rest of the crowd included people likely anxious for potential conflict, others 
interested in preventing it, and some merely curious about what was to commence. 
As the local black speakers arrived at the park by afternoon to begin their portion 
of the event, it became apparent that the rally would not proceed as planned.  Keynote 
speaker Cleaver   had not yet shown up, and rumors circulated that he had been detained 
at some point on his trip with the Black Arts Theater.  The presence of additional law 
enforcement officers, in the form of seven cars of plain-clothes detectives, the continual 
circling of local police cars, and two law enforcement officers on a hill with binoculars, 
further exacerbated the situation.
22
  Despite the rally‟s seeming lack of organization, 
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Colden Browne and several black speakers used their own P.A. system and microphone 
to begin speaking to the assembled crowd about the necessity of revolution in the black 
community to combat police harassment and brutality.  Erma Hepburn, a Neighborhood 
Service Center worker, did not recognize the majority of the men who made up the group 
of black activists.  “There was no rally as such,” she told the Oregonian.  “There was 
very little organization of any kind.  The speakers – I‟d say there were between 8 and 12 
– tried to get things going … but young people in the park kept jeering them.”
23
   
According to an Oregonian report, individuals in the crowd who had been 
drinking cough syrup and wine and playing dice, began to harass the speakers by 
interrupting their messages with hooting and cat calls.  More militant elements at the 
park, however, eventually succeeded in grabbing the microphone and began chanting 
“kill the honkies” and “burn the town down,” before beginning their efforts to recruit a 
mob of bystanders to break into a local store to grab guns.  Upon hearing such conspiring, 
the rally‟s speakers responded that while they were not there to start a riot, “if you‟re here 
to talk about a revolution, then that‟s something else.”
24
  
As tensions built, more of the crowd became increasingly agitated by the 
increasingly visible police presence in the park.  Meanwhile, Reverend Jackson observed 
the situation from a car parked across the street: “I heard a lot of bad language and 
statements about‟ getting white people.‟  But not everybody at the rally was in agreement 
with the speakers,” he told the Oregonian.  “I heard several people in the audience say it 
[rioting] wouldn‟t work.  The others kept saying it would.”
25
    Frustrated by interruptions 
and the behavior of certain members of the crowd, the group of black speakers grabbed 
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their sound equipment and left the speaking spot near the park‟s wading pool, re-
establishing themselves at a hollow in the center of the park, where they again began to 
hold forth.
26
   
While the majority of the people present at the park seemed opposed to the ideas 
of riot and revolution proposed by some of the speakers, a smaller minority of more 
militant youths had taken the message to heart, chanting “Whitey, Go Home!” at various 
white members of the crowd.  Two white men present at the rally that day, Ira 
Williamson, a 51 year old employee of the Portland Parks Department, and Vernon 
Wolvert, an employee of the University of Oregon Medical School who lived across the 
street from the park, were the first casualties of the day‟s violence and unrest.  At about 
5:30 p.m., and with the relatively large crowds at the park beginning to disperse, the two 
men, who had previously been observing the rally with several other adults, mainly 
African-American, found themselves attacked by a group of young black men.  Suffering 
five broken teeth, cuts to his mouth, multiple bruises to his ribs, and the theft of his 
wristwatch and wallet, Williamson had been surrounded by a group of black youths who 
began to push him around the circle, repeatedly punching him and prohibiting him from 
falling down to brace himself.
27
  Remaining conscious throughout the beating, 
Williamson had been kicked twelve times before Linzi Roy, a black school teacher 
working in the park bureau‟s summer program, intervened by dragging Williamson out of 
the park and into a nearby building, before having him taken to the hospital.  Vernon 
Wolvert, while also physically attacked in the aftermath of the rally, had not been 
severely hurt.
28
  In recounting the experience days after the attack, Williamson indicated 
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that his assailants were not individuals he recognized as frequent patrons of the park, 
citing that many of them were older than the people he worked with daily.
29
   
As the nature of the events at Irving Park quickly shifted from a rally to a clash, 
the prospect of conflict with local police seemed inevitable. The day‟s first report of 
violence, listed at 5:18 p.m. by Portland Police Inspector Frank Springer, pertained to a 
group of black youths armed with clubs who threw bottles and rocks through the 
windows of the Lampus discount store. By 6:30 p.m., reports of extensive rock throwing 
directed towards passing motorists and police officers precipitated both the sealing off of 
a thirty block area of the neighborhood as well as the request of additional police officers 
to aid in the patrolling of the troubled area.
30
 Those loitering around Irving Park, where 
many of the problems had begun, and which served as the epicenter for much of the 
disturbances throughout the night, often found themselves the target of a police force 
attempting to clear the area to prohibit the further progression of vandalism and violence.  
In addition to the police, two local preachers, O.B. Williams and Reverend Wendall 
Wallace, part of the Albina civilian community‟s effort to quell the disturbances, were 
also asked to head to Irving Park to dissuade teenagers from rock and bottle throwing in 
the area.  One youth, a local fourteen year old interviewed in the Oregonian the following 
day, was picked up and detained overnight for merely being present at the park, 
something he felt was not all that uncommon: “I wasn‟t rioting, just standing in the park.  
Those cops pulled up and began grabbing everybody.  I was one of the ones they 
grabbed.  I was just listening to a man talk.”
31
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Despite police efforts to crack down on potential problems around Irving Park, 
numerous other disorders occurred throughout the district that evening.  A clothing store 
at the corner of NE Williams and Knott Street, while having been broken into and 
partially vandalized, was not robbed or looted.  Along Union Avenue, between Fremont 
Street and Beach Street, many local businesses, such as Lincoln Park Grocery, Stereo 
Unlimited, and Paramount Linoleum, suffered broken windows from thrown bottles and 
rocks from passing cars.  Stereo Unlimited, located along Union Avenue, was the lone 
store to have been looted Sunday night, although the damage was limited to a few stereo 
tapes.  Of far greater significance were a series of fires that had broken out throughout 
Albina before being placed under control.  The largest, taking place at a two story 
building on Union Avenue that housed both the Union Coin Operated Laundromat and 
American Auto Parts, Inc., broke out shortly after 10 p.m. as the likely result of a 
firebomb.
32
  Another fire, while not as large, erupted at the Sav-Mor Food Market on N. 
Mississippi Avenue, and constituted the most expensive conflagration of the evening, 
causing nearly $20,000 worth of damages.
33
  A fire bomb tossed through the window of 
the Alberta Furniture Store led to the night‟s lone shooting, when police officers fired on 
Jesse Johnson, a black eighteen-year old, after they observed him hurling a Molotov 
cocktail through the store window.  Taken to Multnomah County Hospital, where many 
victims of the riot were already being treated with cuts, scrapes and bruises, Johnson 
survived the buckshot injuries to his back, legs, and stomach, and was booked on arson 
charges with a $5,000 bail.
34
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Ten other smaller fires, also likely the result of fire bombs, had broken out as well 
before firefighters adequately extinguished them before midnight. Tom Potter, a beat 
officer in the Sellwood neighborhood at the time, and later both Chief of Police and 
Mayor of Portland, recounted the scene he faced at the outset of the racial 
demonstrations:  
The police were not prepared for what was coming down the pike.  We went out 
there with very little training, very little equipment and a huge gulf between us 
and the African-American community.  On one occasion, I remember standing at 
what was then NE Union and Fremont.  Every building within my line of sight 
was on fire.  There were people in the streets.  I heard occasional gunfire.
35
 
Journalist Ralph Friedman, covering the event for the Oregon Journal, reported the 
response of a local black man to the rampant vandalism. “Tell them the white merchants 
on Union Avenue could have 10 Union Avenues for all the profit they‟ve drained out of 
us,” he stated.  “Tell them Portland stinks behind its roses.  Tell them we‟re not monkeys 
and this isn‟t a zoo.”
36
   
As Portland police authorities continued their efforts to successfully combat the 
civil unrest throughout Albina that evening, Mayor Terry Schrunk and Governor Tom 
McCall began to develop the political response to the situation.  Having arrived in 
Portland around 9:00 p.m. that evening, McCall and Schrunk, along with the heads of the 
Oregon National Guard; Major General Donald Anderson, Oregon‟s adjutant general; 
Holly Holcomb, the head of the state police; and various other members of the governor‟s 
staff, met at the Hilton Hotel, where they began to monitor and discuss the disturbances.
37
  
While McCall and Schrunk strategized, Police Inspector Frank Springer, speaking at a 
press conference arranged by Portland Chief of Police Donald I. MacNamara, gave the 
 29 
city‟s first statement on the situation.  Recounting the events that began at Irving Park 
earlier in the day, as well as the events still unfolding around him at that moment, 
Springer was clear in making the point that circulating rumors of black violence 
throughout the city such as sniper firing and looting had been unconfirmed.  Presented 
with the situation in its existing form, moreover, neither Springer nor any other 
representative of the Portland Police Department considered the disturbances to be a 
riot.
38
  While little else of Springer‟s remaining briefing was of note, he did address 
inquiries from local black residents in the area as to how they might contribute to helping 
stem the unrest.  Springer responded that if they felt so moved, their assistance in 
diffusing tensions in the most fragile and tenuous areas of the district would be greatly 
welcomed.
39
   
Following their meeting at the Hilton, both the mayor and governor reconvened at 
the mayor‟s office, where an informal command center was set up for the duration of the 
evening and morning.  Asked of his initial impressions of the situation, McCall 
responded that every precaution was being taken by local police officials and city leaders, 
and despite the situation still being “in flux,” he believed Portland to be in good shape 
and “coping.”
40
  Mayor Schrunk, unable to get a telegram off to the Oregon congressional 
delegation in Washington earlier in the day, sent a note between 11:30 p.m. and midnight 
providing details of the situation: “Portland disturbance is very minor and not a riot.  
Portland officials have situation well in hand.  We have provided backup as an additional 
precaution. Will advise if this status changes.”
41
 As McCall and Schrunk maintained their 
vigil at City Hall, the police continued attempts to keep congregating crowds of youth, 
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nearly three hundred young men and women at the height of the disturbances, from 
moving.   
Of the four hundred police officers present in Albina, only two hundred were 
immediately ordered into the area, where they were given the task of riding, four and five 
to a car, with orders to nullify and prevent disorder.  Given orders to wear helmets at all 
times and to keep their rifles and shotguns in the cars and out of the public‟s view, the 
behavior of the police force was to be one of steady but subtle progress in clearing the 
area.  Two hundred other officers were also on standby, having been called in from other 
parts of the city, as was the Oregon National Guard‟s 2
nd
 Battalion of the 218
th
 Field 
Artillery, consisting of five hundred men in reserve at the Portland Air Base, and another 
six thousand reservists at home.  In addition, state police were on alert and in reserve 
south of Portland, in Milwaukie.  Each of those reserve forces was ready to move within 
fifteen minutes of notification.
42
 
By midnight of Sunday, nineteen individuals – thirteen adults, three of which 
were white, as well as six juveniles - had been arrested on a variety of charges.  Shortly 
after midnight, and as a result of orders by the mayor to do so, police officers began to 
round up and arrest any individual – black or white – on violation of a city curfew 
ordinance implemented only hours earlier, further helping to clear the seventy square 
blocks of the problem area.  By 12:30 a.m. Monday morning, despite Police Inspector 
Frank Springer‟s official declaration that the situation in Albina was clear and under 
control, circumstances proved otherwise.  Between 12:30 a.m. and 3:30 a.m., the Portland 
Fire Department received fifteen more fire calls, bringing the number of fire calls since 
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5:00 p.m. the previous day to a total of twenty-six; all of which were directly related to 
the disturbances in the area.  Twenty-eight more individuals, seventeen of which were 
white and eighteen of which were juveniles, were arrested in the early morning hours, 
with many of the whites arrested on violations of carrying guns in their cars through the 
problem areas.  
Newspaper responses to the Albina disturbances, with only a few exceptions, 
were overwhelmingly critical of youth charged with instigating the turmoil and 
praiseworthy of the police.  The front page of the Oregonian, featuring a picture of six 
armed Portland police officers forming a human blockade on Union Street late Sunday 
night, set the tone for much of the day‟s discourse headline blaring, “Negroes Break 
Windows, Set Fires” and a sub-headline, “Police Move to Put Down Disturbances.”  In 
the Oregon Journal, the tepid lead headline, “Albina „Quiet‟ After Racial Flareup,” was 
overshadowed by the hyperbolic lead article on the disturbances, “Gangs Burn Stores; 
Youth Shot; 6 Hurt,” which neglected to place context into which races were involved, 
and in what context such acts occurred.    
In the seventeen stories written about the event that appeared in the two main 
Portland papers the following Monday, fifteen of them drew a clear antagonism between 
the black community and police force. Only two articles attempted to speak to the root 
causes of the disturbances or to try to place them within the context of the larger urban 
unrest and race riots taking place throughout the country that summer.  Staff writer Stan 
Federman‟s front page story in the Oregonian described  “roving bands of negroes” who 
“surged through the streets” carrying out “scattered acts of vandalism,” whose delinquent 
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behavior was only subdued when police moved “swiftly and calmly” to quell the 
trouble.
43
  Significantly, Federman‟s dispatch made no reference to the twenty white 
males who had also been arrested nor made any mention of the role of the Portland police 
force in the confrontation.  Nor did either newspaper offer anything approaching nuanced 
coverage of the problems of racism and their role in precipitating much of what had 
occurred.  
To nearly all of the adults and elderly living in Albina, regardless of race or 
gender, the outbreak of violence in the community was seen as saddening and deplorable.  
Many blacks, such as Bennie Carson, who lived in the area and saw his business set on 
fire, viewed the previous night‟s disturbance as a setback in race relations: “After all the 
progress,” Carson lamented to the Oregon Journal, “it‟s just a damn shame.  It was a 
bunch of young folks who hurt all of us.”
44
    Many residents blamed the outbreak on 
„outsiders‟ from other areas of the country, who had come to Portland to create unrest.  
Al Rivers, a local businessman, asserted that the tranquility of black life in Portland could 
have only been shattered by individuals from outside Oregon. “There‟s no trouble in 
Portland like they have out east,” he told the Journal.  “The police could stop this in a 
minute by simply driving the agitators outside of town.  We don‟t want young punks who 
are simply following along, acting up for no reason at all.  The cops ought to get real 
tough with them.”
45
  Leroy Loos, also of the area, argued that the situation was 
inevitable. “Everybody knew it was coming,” he observed.  “And they‟ll probably be 
more tonight.  All of us, colored and white neighbors alike, have been knowing this 
would happen and hoping it wouldn‟t.  They had outsiders coming in to stir the young 
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ones up.  Nobody in Albina who has any sense was in on it.”
46
  Otto Rutherford, a 
prominent member of the Portland civil rights movement, stated that it was obvious that 
the dissension occurred as a result of outsiders because “we don‟t have too many rabble 
rousers.  Fundamentally, our kids are pretty decent kids.  And we have no tenements in 
the truest sense.”
47
  One of the community‟s black leaders, John H. Jackson, Mt. Olivet‟s 
Baptist Church pastor, stated that he was “positive” the disturbances were caused by 
outside agitators.  Jackson claimed it was common knowledge, both throughout the 
Albina community and among city government officials, that a rally planning meeting 
had taken place among a number of individuals who had driven up to Portland from 
various parts of California.
48
 
Others in the community saw the flare-up as the senseless result of restless 
teenagers, many of whom were already known to social welfare and church groups, and 
young adults, likely unemployed and already volatile, who made poor decisions and gave 
vent to their summer boredom.  Mayfield Webb, a prominent member of the African-
American community, saw two main factors at work.  “One was the rally in Irving Park, 
and the other was the group of youngsters that caused disturbances,” he stated.  “Whether 
the youngsters and the rally were directly connected, we can‟t say.”
49
  A local white shop 
owner, despite having his store windows broken, spoke to his view of the mayhem: 
“People here are good people,” he told the Oregonian.  “We deal with them day in and 
day out and have never had any trouble before.  It‟s the kids.  We heard a lot of rumors 
about a possible outbreak this past week – but still, this is all pretty unexpected for us.”
50
  
An Albina resident, Emma Hatten, also saw the behavior of the local youths as irrational, 
 34 
given her perception of the racial dynamics that existed in Portland at the time: “It‟s a 
bunch of young ones getting all excited.  I don‟t know why,” she declared.  “The white 
people in Portland have been real good.  We don‟t have any trouble at all.  Now I think 
we‟ll move out of here.”
51
  Others, such as Jerry Brown, a white Albina resident, saw the 
stereotypes such behavior created as unequal and misleading: “If white kids did 
something like this it wouldn‟t reflect on the rest of us, but this way it‟s not the same, and 
that‟s too bad,” he stated. “I know a couple of carloads of white men were pulled in and 
they were carrying rifles.  That‟s where the real trouble starts – with the looters who try 
to take advantage.”
52
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Chapter 2: Public Response to the Irving Park Disturbances (1967) 
While the initial aftermath of the Irving Park disturbances led to debate regarding 
who was responsible, there seemed to be, with few exceptions, commendation and 
esteem for the Portland police officers charged with quelling the commotion.  Adult and 
elderly Albina residents, both black and white, were nearly unanimous in their applause 
of the police‟s conscientiousness and deftness in handling what could have been an 
explosive situation.  A black Albina woman, speaking as a community member, stated 
that “the entire black community is as upset about this as the rest of the city is.  It‟s a 
pretty tense situation for everyone and it takes a great deal of common sense by everyone 
to handle these kids.”
1
  J.D. Millner, an African-American businessman, located within 
the Albina District, wrote to Mayor Schrunk that the police had been courteous and polite 
throughout the disturbances.  Referring to the disorder as “minor troubles,” Millner 
insisted that, as a black business owner in a predominantly black area, “I can‟t afford to 
see our property go up in smoke.  My people are only hurting themselves.”  He closed by 
sounding a refrain heard among many black adults that the community could not gain  
“by rioting and breaking the law, and the guilty ones should be punished to the full extent 
of the law.”
2
  Katharine T. Noyes, a Portland resident of unknown racial background, 
praised the mayor‟s “great success” in handling the city‟s racial problem and suggested 
that he read a recent Parade magazine article titled “A New Way to Stop Race Riots.”
3
  
An entirely different response emerged from several young members of the 
Albina community.  To many black youths, the confrontations served as an attempt to 
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redress injustices and inequalities that had pervaded police-community relations in the 
neighborhood for years.  “There‟s a new awareness in these kids,” stated Frank Fair, a 
member of C-CAP and Albina‟s Operation Contact.  If Albina was going to be treated as 
a separate area by city officials, Fair argued, then “they‟ll have to deal with their 
problems in those terms.”
4
  The necessity of nearly four hundred armed police officers 
backed up both by National Guard and state police to subdue seventy five to eighty local 
teenagers and young adults served as a microcosm of the racism they believed the 
Portland police department customarily demonstrated towards Albina‟s blacks.  Colden 
Browne, Jr., one of the speakers at Irving Park during Sunday‟s events, spoke to the 
atmosphere that existed in Albina. On Monday, he explained, “everyone for the first time 
in their Portland lives, got sober, looked out in the streets which were still occupied, and 
saw what THE BEAST really intended to do to them (a concentration camp can be made 
of Albina in 16 minutes).”
5
    
Among activists such as Browne, the portrayal of the events as a calculated 
uprising by black radicals was not only dishonest but failed to account for the tension-
raising pre-rally presence of the police at Irving Park.  Brown saw the assertion by Ron 
Schmidt, Governor McCall‟s Press Secretary, that “Black Power Negroes have come into 
Portland” as an overreaction and as inherently misleading, since authorities at the time 
could not determine what the relationship was, if any, between the rally at Irving Park, 
and the violence that erupted throughout Portland that night.
6
 “These honkies in Portland 
would like to blame „outside agitators,‟ communists, or men from Mars,” asserted one 
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Albina resident.  “Anything to sweep it under the rug and forget about it.”
7
 For Browne, 
the press and police had worked in concert to portray the event as a riot, despite direct 
statements given by Springer, Schrunk, and McCall, that given their information on the 
situation, the disturbances could not be so classified.
8
  
On the following morning after the disturbances, Portland city officials as well as 
Governor McCall were determined to downplay the events of the previous night.  In a 
press conference that day, Police Inspector Frank K. Springer stated that nearly all of the 
incidents from the night before had dissipated between midnight and 2:30 a.m. and that 
while it was “a tense and difficult situation, it didn‟t really seem to have gotten out of 
control.”  Springer added that as of 7:03 a.m. that morning, the police had returned back 
to their normal routine.  Police Chief Donald MacNamara stated that because there had 
not been a great deal of agitation or retaliation by whites, he did not expect the 
disturbance to flare up again. Yet MacNamara acknowledged that he had ordered 
“intensified patrol” by cops on the street.
9
  Speaking of a joint press conference, Mayor 
Schrunk and Governor McCall reiterated that neither man viewed the events of the 
previous day as part of a race riot; that while there was some evidence to conclude that 
outside agitators had played a role, a small minority of the troublemakers had been 
Albina residents; and that advance planning for such racial trouble, particularly in the 
form of riot training, played a crucial role in the success of de-escalating the situation.
10
   
“The mood of Portland‟s non-whites is one of intolerance towards violence,” 
declared McCall, adding “that the seeds of hatred find inhospitable roots in Portland.” 
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The governor also insisted that the black community should not be painted as a whole as 
a result of the behavior of a small group of individuals.  The only controversial aspect of 
the McCall-Schrunk press-conference may have come when both men laid partial blame 
for the violence and vandalism on two Portland Public school levies that voters had failed 
to pass.  In a joint statement, the two political leaders contended that “the inability or the 
disinclination of the citizenry to finance adequate education programs is a root cause of 
the major sociological dilemmas of the American metropolis.”
11
 
Beyond issues of school funding, several community leaders and social activists 
tied youth unrest to structural issues.  To many critics, the biggest obstacle to a calm and 
tranquil Albina neighborhood was deep-seated unemployment and a lack of job training 
opportunities.  An Oregonian feature two days after the incident pursued this theme by 
interviewing several labor and civil rights experts throughout Oregon.  Mark Smith, 
director of the civil rights division of the Oregon Bureau of Labor, pointed to the fact that 
unemployment rates among Negroes were twice as high as among whites, a reality 
reflected in the schools, social services and community activities.
12
  Groups such as the 
Portland Urban League argued that prejudiced employers contributed to the disparity in 
unemployment rates, yet the Multnomah County Labor Council insisted there was 
“absolutely no discrimination” in organized labor‟s role in hiring or training.
13
   
Seeking to move beyond the debate on unemployment and job training, a nineteen 
member meeting of city government liaisons, C-CAP members, and Albina Community 
Action Program Members, known as the Metro Steering Committee commenced the 
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night after the disturbances. Some of the participants were concerned that there had been 
an absence of specific grievances to motivate discontent, beyond longstanding and 
generalized complaints regarding housing, employment and police brutality.  Others were 
distraught by the disparity between those who seemed to have arrived at Irving Park 
looking to create trouble, and those who merely got swept up in the crowd‟s behavior.  
Reaction to the role of the media was particularly disparaging, as was much of the 
feedback regarding the preemptive escalation by law enforcement, which many at the 
meeting thought to have contributed to the tension in the community.  
  Ultimately, the committee took away three main points: 
1) Around seventy-five teenagers had been involved in the disturbances, but none 
 of them had been a worker in a community action war on poverty program. 
2) The actions themselves were neither well planned or executed as agitation, and 
 nobody was certain what outside forces were at work. 
 3) Positive resistance from workers within the community played an integral role 
 in preventing the spreading of the mayhem throughout the area.
14
  
 
Many of the area‟s youth showed far less interest in reconciliation.  As had been 
the case the day before, Irving Park became a rendezvous point that Monday afternoon 
for angry and agitated black youth seemingly displeased both by their portrayal 
throughout the press, which many felt unfairly characterized their behavior as “riots,” as 
well as with the behavior of the police force, whom many felt were arresting bystanders 
merely because it was easier than rooting out the actual instigators.  Those arrested on the 
Sunday night sweep of Albina cited the epidemic of rioting throughout American cities as 
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a predominant reason for Portland‟s own troubles.  “The riot spirit is catching,” one 
young man noted.  “As long as there are riots and trouble in other cities, there will be 
riots here.  I know it‟s not going to do anyone any good … but there‟s nothing I can do 
about that.”   Others arrested on Sunday night cited the police as both agitating the 
behavior of the crowd with unwarranted arrests while at the same time taming a situation 
that would have exploded without them: “If you didn‟t have those police over there, 
things would be a lot worse,” one detainee declared. “The police are keeping the lid on.”  
Another went as far as drawing a distinction between white and black cops. “White cops 
are better than black in a deal like this.  Crowds go for Negro police,” he observed.  
“How would you like one of your own carrying a gun against you?”
15
   
The first signs of disorder on that Monday occurred around 4:30 in the afternoon 
when a bottle, stuffed with a gasoline soaked rag, was set on fire and thrown into a pile of 
tires at a service station along Union Avenue.  Police who had been monitoring the 
incremental gathering of young blacks around N.E. 7th and Fremont descended upon 
Irving Park, where a group was throwing rocks and glass bottles at the windows of 
passing vehicles.  Determining the situation unsafe following head wounds to three 
individuals, including an eighteen month old child, the police set up a traffic barricade at 
the entrance of Union Avenue and Fremont Street.  Over the next few hours, as the large 
group of youths continued to drift between Irving Park and the barricaded intersection 
nearly two blocks away, police periodically intervened as police cars and area homes 
became the targets of rocks and bottles.   
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Few arrests resulted until nearly 8 p.m., when Mayor Schrunk ordered police to 
clear Irving Park of all patrons and to “start making plenty of arrests” for disorderly 
conduct.
16
  Brandishing rifles and shotguns, nearly one-hundred fifty members of the 
police, backed up by three eighteen man tactical operations platoons specializing in riot 
control, immediately moved toward Irving Park.  Dispersing the crowd of nearly eighty, 
the officers arrested several alleged instigators of the rock throwing near Irving Park and 
the fire bombings along Union Avenue.  By midnight, nearly seven hours after the initial 
outbreak, police officials reported the situation to be calm and under control.  The night‟s 
tally ultimately included sixty eight individuals arrested and thirteen fire calls, ten of 
which were classified as arson.
17
 
Response to Albina‟s second night of “rowdyism” once again came down 
predominantly in support of local police and government officials, and in opposition to 
individuals both directly and indirectly involved in the disorder.  Both blacks and whites 
living in and around the Albina area continued to vocalize abhorrence for the violence in 
the community.  Op-Eds throughout local newspapers over the following days spoke of 
the need to continue the positive dialogue between blacks and whites in hopes of sparing 
Portland a major racial riot in the future; others commended the police for their patience 
and highly professionalized manner.  Many letters written to the Mayor and Chief of 
Police from local businesses and organizations such as the Oregon Liquor Commission, 
the Irvington Community Association, and Pacific Bell lauded the role of local law 
enforcement. Other letters from individual citizens, while often praising both McNamara 
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and Police Inspector Springer, insinuated that Portland would have confronted a dire 
situation both in damage to property and race relations, had things been handled 
differently.  A KPOJ radio editorial on the disturbances from August 3 was 
unapologetically supportive, editorializing that “the fact that the damages have been 
minimal and injuries only slight reflects directly upon the effective leadership of the 
Albina Community and upon the competency and efficiency of our government 
agencies.”
18
  
Despite these votes of confidence, Mayor Schrunk found himself on the defensive 
among some critics who saw his response as either too accommodating to destructive 
behavior or lacking alternative and productive remedies.  One correspondent, Bibiana 
Maher, saw the Schrunk-McCall statement on the failed school levies as so outrageous 
that she questioned whether the mayor had been misquoted.  “If a canvas were to be 
made of those arrested, the percentage of dropouts would be high,” she chastised.  “And 
no amount appropriations could counteract their inclinations to riot.”
19
  Another woman, 
feeling as though the city and state politicians had coddled and enabled the blacks of the 
city, wrote that “it was high time that the politicians stopped shelling out the taxpayers 
[sic] money trying to help the negros [sic], when they would be better off earning their 
own way and their own jobs and shaping their own future.”
20
 Still another found it 
ominous that the worst riots had occurred in the most „advanced‟ cities in the north, not 
in South Carolina or Mississippi.   
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Some correspondents wrote that damages around Irving Park were exacerbated by 
the police force‟s lack of a militaristic approach while others opined on the penalties that 
should face those convicted of vandalism and assault. Someone even provided the mayor 
the name and address of an individual who had been involved in the disturbances but had 
not been caught.  Others offered alternative ways to help blacks extract themselves from 
cycles of poverty and unemployment.  One correspondent hope Portlanders would “stand 
behind our police force and maintain law and order – but at the same time act to create 
more schools, hospitals, housing, and jobs.”
21
 Another, a white man teaching in a Model 
Cities school, contrasted older African-Americans who tended to be “docile and content, 
and sensible in handling these racial problems” with “youth who are feeling lost and 
frustrated, filled with energy with little opportunity to give it release,” people he 
described with “little to lose as they see it.”
22
 
By the second night of chaos, reaction from the public had become much more 
vitriolic.  In a letter to Mayor Schrunk dated August 1, Portland resident Margaret 
Luyben proposed that the mayor make an announcement that the police shoot any of the 
“militant black negroes” who are seen to be looting or destroying property.
23
  A local 
radio editorial blamed the week‟s “hell raising” on a group of “hoodlum elements” who 
expected that they “should be handed something rather than working for it.”  As had been 
the trend nationally, levels of suspicion and anger toward racial agitation and discord 
seemed to increase with the frequency of the disruptions.
24
  Many city residents blamed 
the disturbances on outside agitators as opposed to local black youth.  Despite the 
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absence of evidence to support it, such sentiments were also voiced by both Mayor Terry 
Schrunk and Police Chief Donald McNamara who, having searched 450 cars between 
late Monday evening and early Tuesday morning, declared that whatever agitators had 
instigated Albina‟s racial strife the previous two nights no longer were in the city.  
Arrested youths, interviewed by reporters the following day, echoed similar statements, 
saying that any Black Power elements who had started the disturbances were already 
gone.   
Letters to the mayor written in the days following the riots frequently spoke of 
outside individuals.  Clifford Daniels, a black man who had lived in Albina for fifty three 
years, protested that “The people of Albina do not want any trouble and are not going 
along with outside agitators, although they may come in here and get some of these punk 
hoodlums to follow them.”
25
  An Op-Ed in the Oregon Journal titled “Portland‟s Turn on 
the Riot Scene” stated that “what is striking about about the relatively small amount of 
arson and window-smashing by hoodlums which took place in Portland Sunday and 
Monday nights is that it appears to have been triggered by agitators.”
26
 Speculation over 
the role of outside agitators in the Albina disturbances were given additional credence 
when it was reported in an August 1
 
newspaper article that a train load of thirty blacks 
had been sent to arrive in Portland from California that Monday night to help foster 
additional trouble.  When the train arrived, Portland police, augmented by railroad 
detectives, were able to capture four of the individuals, three blacks and one white, while 
twenty others fled the premises.  Despite the protestations of the individuals that they had 
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legitimate business in Portland, the Oregon Journal‟s article detailing the supposed plot 
reinforced existing beliefs of the presence of outside agitators.
27
   
Panic over outside agitators received confirmation for some Oregonians at a 
Monday night speech by Lola Belle Holmes, a former African-American communist and 
undercover FBI agent.  Sponsored by a group called TACT (Truth About Civil Turmoil), 
and speaking to an overflow crowd at a high school in suburban Hillsboro, Holmes stated 
that the riots spreading throughout American cities, including Portland, were largely 
communist instigated and encouraged.  Denouncing civil rights leaders such as Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and SNCC Chair Stokely Carmichael as “dupes” of the Communist 
Party, Hill detailed the conspiracy that enveloped Portland and other cities plagued by 
unrest. The civil rights movement “gives the impression that it is a champion of Negroes, 
in order to use them for the attack upon our country – with Negroes on the front line,” she 
proclaimed.  “You witnessed in your own city one of these attacks.”
28
 
In contrast to such assertions, Lorenz Schultz, a pastor at a Methodist Church in 
the area, argued that the role of any outside agitator should be downplayed, given that 
such explosive behavior within the community could not have been exploited by 
outsiders, if that was truly what had occurred, without the presence of already existing 
racial tension.
29
   Indeed, little to no evidence supported the case for outside intervention. 
FBI agent John H. Williams reported that Monday that despite checking out reports and 
claims that professional agitators had been brought to Portland to instigate rioting, 
nothing supporting such a theory had been confirmed.
30
  Six young blacks who had been 
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arrested in the Monday night disturbances and interviewed by Oregonian reporter Peter 
Tugman, despite believing that outside instigators had orchestrated the turmoil, were 
unable to identify any of them, relate any of what they had said, or accurately state where 
such individuals had come from.
31
  On Tuesday, Lieutenant Jack Crawford of the 
Intelligence squad of the Portland Police Department, said that while they had been 
hunting down the “outside agitator” rumors, “We can‟t verify them and we have no real 
evidence that outsiders are responsible for what has been going on the last two nights.”  
In contrast, Crawford described the Irving Park incident as “a fairly organic disturbance” 
attributed to local youth.
32
  That same day, J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI, told 
President Lyndon Johnson‟s advisory committee on racial disorders that neither he, nor 
any other individual within the agency, possessed intelligence regarding an orchestrated 
conspiracy behind the fifty two racial disorders that had occurred throughout the country 
the previous three years.
33
  
Whether the public disorders on July 30 and July 31 had been instigated by 
outside elements or were simply the manifestation of festering strains in the community, 
the incident enabled a few black youths the opportunity to voice their grievances both to 
church ministers throughout the Albina district as well as city officials.  Responding to 
the complaints of inadequate housing, job shortages, and park recreation among black 
youths in the community, Mayor Schrunk attended an August 2
nd
 with nearly twenty 
young people where he assured attendees that city government would do everything in its 
power to assist the neighborhood. “There certainly are some pretty old houses over 
 
 
48 
there,” he commented.  Schrunk then heard a volley of complaints concerning the 
prevalence of rodents, inadequate garbage pickup, and inequalities in the hiring process 
of black park employees.
34
  Joined by City Commissioner Frank Ivancie and Russell 
Peyton, a member of the city‟s Human Relations Committee, the mayor promised to 
assist in finding solutions yet he also said he could not make promises such as 
immediately withdrawing the police contingent from Albina or revising the district‟s 
school curricula that he could not keep.   
To many of present at the meeting, the exchange left them frustrated suggesting 
that the mayor did not understand the underlying problems plaguing the community.  
“Nobody ever listened to these kids,” stated an Albina social worker present at the 
meeting.  “Not their parents, not their ministers, and least of all the people who keep 
promising that if we work together, thing will be better.”
35
   Many criticized Schrunk‟s 
apparent disinterest in the area, citing the fact that he had rarely visited Albina, repeatedly 
sending aides and staff members to carry out any business his presence would have 
necessitated.  “What is Albina, a foreign country?” one youth responded.
36
  Additionally, 
several people complained that many of the jobs for which blacks in Albina were 
qualified and routinely applied for, such as maintenance positions at local recreation 
centers and parks, as well as manual labor and construction jobs throughout the 
neighborhood, were never given to them.  Oliver O‟Ferrell, a twenty year old Albina 
resident, spoke to this disparity.  “There are no Negroes employed on the park‟s 
maintenance staff,” he pointed out.  “Right here in our own neighborhood, white people 
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have all of the jobs.”  Other issues of contention included the police presence throughout 
Albina, the blight of decrepit and decaying homes throughout the neighborhood, and the 
stereotypical portrayals of African-Americans throughout the Portland Public School 
textbooks and curriculum. Community members “have been trying to say something,” an 
unidentified speaker complained.  “Nobody wanted to listen.  They‟ve been going around 
in circles.”
37
  The complaint seemed to be borne out at meetings later in the day between 
Albina residents and Frank Ivancie, when the parks commissioner found “no basis” for 
the charge that African-Americans were excluded from employment in the neighborhood 
city parks.
38
 
As the Albina community returned to a sense of normalcy, fears of additional 
violence and a full-fledged riot subsided.  A fire-bombing at a fuel company on Tuesday 
night, along with the arrests of ten adults and fifteen juveniles – six for possessing fire 
bombs - while initially precipitating concern, produced no new outbreak of violence as 
the police resumed on heightened alert.  By mid-day Wednesday, however, police 
presence in the community had been reduced in size and officers previously forced to 
work twelve-hour days began to return to routine eight-hour work schedules.  Wednesday 
also brought the first day of arraignments for many of the suspects arrested over the 
previous two days. Because most centered on disorderly conduct, nearly all the 
individuals arraigned were given sixty-day jail sentences for their roles in the three days 
of disturbances.  Judge Phillip Abraham commented that “it appears that all of those 
arrested during the Albina disturbances have extensive criminal records,” furthering 
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cementing police insistence that nearly all of those deemed worthy of arrest had been the 
leaders and main contributors to the turmoil.  At the same time, the mayor‟s office 
ignored calls to close Irving Park for an unspecified amount of time and instead deferred 
to the sentiments of the residents of the black community, who argued that keeping the 
park open might better the standing of city officials in the eyes of the local people. “As 
long as things remain quiet in the district, it is important that we pull our police out of 
there,” one resident explained.  “Law abiding people shouldn‟t have police around them 
wherever they go.”
39
 
To some extent, the disturbances that occurred in the Albina district between July 
30th and August 1st were not only a racial problem, but a youth problem.  Albina‟s small 
population of young, angry, and restless agitators, seeking an outlet and a way to lash out, 
could likely have been found in every neighborhood of every city around the country.  
Vocal displeasure over a lack of neighborhood public parks and recreation areas, job 
opportunities, and employment training were not problems that were unique to Albina, or 
even black communities in general.  Race, while certainly a factor in the Albina 
disturbances, was not, in and of itself, the only cause.  Of the 430 youths enrolled in the 
in-school Neighborhood Youth Corps, a program that gave part-time and summer 
employment to youths from low-income families to enable them to continue their 
education, and of which many were black, only four had been arrested in the 
disturbances.
40
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Such facts as these indicate that race, while certainly a factor in unrest, was not as 
powerful a motivator as that of poverty.  In many cases, older, wealthier, and more 
established blacks throughout Albina found themselves in an alliance with whites 
regarding younger blacks who participated in the violence.  There was not a monolithic 
response to the disturbances by either the black or white community, partially as a result 
of age and socioeconomic differences, but also because, as stated by numerous members 
of both the press and the black community, there were no explicit grievances voiced by 
those who participated in the turmoil.  One Albina teen-ager held at a juvenile detention 
center following Sunday‟s disorder, argued that much of the discord in black 
communities throughout America, including Portland, was a result of the knowledge that 
large scale rioting, such as that which had occurred in the Watts section of Los Angeles 
two years earlier, led blacks to feel empowered: “There wouldn‟t be any riot here … and 
there wouldn‟t have been any riot in Detroit … if there hadn‟t been a riot before it 
somewhere else.”
41
   
Such statements give credence to arguments that what occurred in and around 
Irving Park, while indirectly fueled by anger over issues of employment, housing, parks, 
and education, may, instead, have been an organic part of a spreading epidemic of rioting 
occurring throughout urban areas in the late-1960s. Portions of Albina‟s black youth 
community certainly sought to pressure city government officials to improve upon the 
social and economic issues plaguing their neighborhood.  Yet those who participated in 
the Irving Park disturbances likely did so not to address those issues as to seek an outlet 
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to express dissatisfaction with the inability to resolve them.  While symbolizing defiance 
in the face of authority, the disturbances lacked any clear or unifying goal, a fact that 
ultimately stifled major reforms in the immediate wake of the unrest.   
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Chapter 3: Changing the Status Quo (1968) 
 To some in Portland, the sole positive outcome of violence in Albina was the 
emergence of new lines of communication that were developing between the white and 
black communities.  In the aftermath of the unrest at Irving Park, various efforts, some 
pragmatic and others more symbolic, were undertaken by city officials and African-
American advocacy organizations to reduce the likelihood of future racial turbulence.   
 In a pragmatic vein, and seeking to appease critics of the police who sought 
greater civilian oversight of law enforcement, Portland Chief of Police Donald 
McNamara established a Police Community Relations Unit that would be aimed at 
improving the “communication and relationships between police and Albina residents.”
1
  
In a similar capacity, Mayor Terry Schrunk and other city officials sought to amend 
policies and ordinances that had proved inadequate in the immediacy of the disturbances.  
Measures which had not adequately addressed what did and did not constitute a city 
emergency were tightened up to reflect growing unease concerning urban unrest.  
Ordinances concerning the constitution and use of explosives and firebombs, for 
example, now were explicitly defined in regard to the composition and use of such 
devices.
2
  
Having cited irresponsible news media coverage of the disturbances as a major 
contributing factor to Portland‟s turmoil, the city government drafted a “City Code for the 
Reporting of Civil Disorders.”
3
  Created and written for the benefit of the city‟s news 
outlets, the document listed fourteen separate goals for reporters regarding how the 
dissemination of information in similar future conflicts should be handled. These 
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included the nuanced (“Seek to use official designation in describing incident.  If police 
call it a disturbance … we should not label it a riot”), the politically beneficial (“Scare 
headlines, scare bulletins and sensationalism of any kind must be avoided”), and the 
sensible (“The potential for inciting public disorder demands that COMPETITION be 
secondary to the cause of PUBLIC SAFETY.  Be governed by rules of caution, good 
taste, and COMMON SENSE.”)
4
 
As minor bureaucratic changes such as these began to be implemented, Mayor 
Schrunk‟s administration initiated its own critical assessment of Portland‟s racial 
situation, as well as the changes and reforms necessary to improve it.  Responding to a 
November 1967 Boston University Political Science research project concerning 
problems facing inter-racial relationships throughout the nation, Schrunk‟s administrative 
assistant, Keith L. Jones, acknowledged that a lack of both quality housing and minority 
employment, partially as a result of a lack of opportunities stemming from racial 
prejudice, played a key role.  To the question “What can government do to foster inter-
racial harmony?” Jones pointed to Portland‟s Head Start program, along with the city‟s 
application to the federal government for Model Cities funding, as commendable efforts 
to improve the racial divide.  At the same time, Schrunk‟s response to the Boston 
University survey noted “the lack of understanding of culture which promotes suspicion 
and frustration, particularly within the minority groups, and the resistance to change on 
the part of the majority so as to frustrate those persons who have been disadvantaged by 
virtue of race within the mainstream of our social and economic climate.”
5
  “It has been 
suggested by some students of the minority race” the mayor added, “that the so-called 
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power structure responds only to crisis situations which result in change to accommodate 
persons of other races and creeds.”
6
 
Schrunk‟s candid assessment was likely the result of his embattled relationship 
with more conservative members of Portland‟s white community who, despite the 
mayor‟s nuanced and nearly universally lauded handling of previous racial 
conflagrations, refused to relent in their attacks on his leadership.  While many in the 
white community worked towards inter-racial compromises on contentious issues, others 
were unceasing in their views.  In correspondence from constituents in the months 
following the disturbances, there were still very clear signs of hostility toward Albina‟s 
black community. Referring to the area‟s African-Americans as “gang bangers,” Nellie 
Mitchell urged the mayor to “do something,” unless he wanted such turmoil to occur 
again.
7
 Another citizen, citing an Oregon Journal article covering a speech given by 
black power activists, blamed the mayor for Portland‟s “radical problem,” and concluded 
that he had recently purchased two guns for his own safety.
8
  Despite such animosities, 
city officials acknowledged that Portland had been negligent in its commitment to 
minority citizens regarding implementation and enforcement of non-discrimination laws.  
 In the months following the Albina disturbances, city government officials 
drafted a list of suggestions for the city to improve non-discrimination policies towards 
minority populations.  The document began with three questions: “Does City government 
have an explicit non-discrimination policy on hiring and upgrading?  Is it written, posted, 
[and] repeated at intervals?  Does everyone understand that city government is serious 
about this policy at every level in all operations?”  It then offered ten pieces of advice 
that focused on efforts to implement and enforce periodic reviews of such policies; the 
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overt publicizing of non-discrimination efforts; attempts to integrate greater numbers of 
minority employees into the city‟s decision-making process; and a reaffirmation of the 
city‟s commitment to non-discrimination in contract bidding.”
9
 
Outside of government, efforts to improve race relations in the city centered on 
the Urban League, which held its 1967 national convention in Portland within a month of 
the disturbances.  Founded in 1945, Portland‟s branch of the Urban League worked to 
provide opportunities in housing, education, and employment for African-Americans who 
had predominantly moved to Portland during World War II to work in the Kaiser 
Shipyards.  When many of these African-Americans chose to stay in Portland following 
the conclusion of the war, the Urban League, which had originally been brought to 
Portland to convince the city‟s blacks to leave, went to work attempting to integrate a city 
with a strong history of racism and prejudice.   
Entitled “People v. the City: Opportunity and Challenge,” the Urban League‟s 
1967 conference initiated a program called “Operation Dialogue.”  Through this 
initiative, Urban League staff members spoke to nearly 5,000 parishioners in thirty-seven 
churches throughout the community on the Sunday of their convention.  In the interest of 
maintaining order and preventing clashes between youth and the police, the organization 
cooperated with community leaders, city agencies, police, and neighborhood people in 
mounting a series of spring meetings to find solutions to problems centered in the 
neighborhood.
10
   
In a similar vein, C-CAP (Church-Community Action Program), which had 
worked to improve police-community relations, held a summit in which Portland‟s black 
and white church people, clergy, and laymen spoke to community tensions.  The group 
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hoped to bridge the gap between establishment whites and an increasing number of 
militant blacks.  “If we are to eliminate the explosive violence that makes the headlines 
and causes people to act irrationally,” it declared, “we need to root out the quiet 
dehumanizing things that happen every day and subject them to the searching light of 
Christian compassion and Christian action.”
11
  C-CAP also used the disturbances to 
solicit donations to fund summer programs for teenagers, as well as weekend seminars in 
the Albina district that provided courses on topics such as Black history and the 
management of race-based confrontation.  Calling on African-Americans to become more 
involved in their community and church and to redirect their anger towards more 
progressive endeavors, C-CAP stressed the necessity of reducing tension in the 
community as well as educating citizens about their roles in society.
12
 
 One major effort by the city at improving race relations was the writing of the 
1967 annual report on race relations by Portland‟s Human Rights Commission (HRC).  
An interracial collection of eleven members, the Commission had been created by a city 
ordinance and was tasked both with investigating complaints of racial and religious 
discrimination, as well as carrying out programs believed to be beneficial in promoting 
tolerance.
13
  Written near the end of the year, and focusing predominantly on issues of 
employment, housing, youth, and education, the report of highlighted many issues that 
played a role in the turmoil months earlier.  On the topic of employment, the document 
stated that while a Task Force of business and labor leaders had been created to educate 
various industries in the spirit of “affirmative action,” there were still problems in 
Portland.  “Disadvantaged minority youth are still not convinced that businesses will hire 
them … no matter how well qualified,” the report read.  “We still have the prevailing 
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belief that discrimination per se is operative.”
14
  The next report cited successful efforts 
by HRC‟s Housing Committee to break down segregation policies that had existed in the 
real estate market for years, leading to a number of black families who, without incident, 
had found homes outside previously segregated residential areas.  Nevertheless, the 
report read, “the overall pattern of resident location still shows resistance to the 
movement of non-whites into all-white areas.”
15
 
For many, however, it was the HRC‟s views on police-community relations that 
were of most interest.  Acknowledging that the police were the “most visible arm of the 
establishment which so many young people are rebelling against,” the Commission took 
seriously the complaints of police mistreatment of minorities.  Referencing the summer 
turmoil between youth and police, the Commission stated that while relations had 
improved, and the work of the police during the unrest was to be commended, far more 
could and would have to be done.  The report cited the fact that many members of 
community youth groups had visited the Commission‟s offices to report complaints of 
police activity, and that in many cases the allegations were investigated, with the results 
of the investigations shared with the complainant.  Furthermore, the Commission had 
worked in tandem with the National Conference of Christians and Jews to improve 
community and police relationships.  These steps, carried out by the HRC on behalf of 
the city, were aimed at helping the community realize its responsibility in solving many 
of its race-related problems. 
Despite efforts to alleviate racial tension, however, there were still underlying 
currents, particularly among younger African-Americans, concerning dissatisfaction with 
the role of traditional blacks in the community.  While Portland NAACP leader Thomas 
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Vickers continued to speak on behalf of Portland‟s black community in an effort to prod 
the city to improve the employment, recreation, and housing options for Albina‟s black 
citizens, younger activists Colden Brown and Oliver O‟Ferrell, participants in the July 
and August disturbances and members of Portland‟s burgeoning Black Power movement, 
saw this solicitation of government programs and funding geared towards racial 
reconciliation as yet another concession by blacks to a racist white power structure.  
Expressing frustration with traditional black organizations, Brown asserted that no 
tangible help had come from the black community for Albina‟s African-American youths 
that had been held in jail and tried, many of them for the first time, as a result of their 
participation at Irving Park.   
“Those organizations that are supposed to be doing something for the Black 
people – the Urban League, NAACP and War on Poverty,” charged Brown, “seem more 
concerned with buying desks, spending a lot of time on the phone, charging their grocery 
bills to the boss and making surveys to show the white man how much progress is being 
made.”
16
  Oliver O‟Ferrell, referencing a shift in Portland‟s black leadership from the old 
guard to a much younger one, decried that traditional black advocacy organizations 
would no longer speak for all blacks.  “Let Tom Vickers [President of the Portland 
Branch of the NAACP] speak for himself and the NAACP,” he stated in an early-August 
Oregonian article.  “I speak for me.  You want to find out what I think, ask me, not Tom 
Vickers.”
17
  Other groups such as the Society for New Action Politics (SNAPS), an 
offshoot of an anti-war organization called the Citizens Coordinating Committee on 
Vietnam (CCV) that worked towards liberal causes such as Native American fishing 
rights and grape worker boycotts, insinuated that blacks employed in government social 
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agencies such as the War on Poverty‟s Office of Economic Opportunity were behaving 
like “Uncle Toms.”
18
  
Appropriately, a January 1968 Oregonian article titled “Study Shows Portland 
Could Explode,” pointed to generally younger, less-established black youths with radical 
views regarding social equality and integration as “new voices” of the black community 
that had supplanted the traditional African-American spokesmen of the NAACP and 
Urban League.  The feature used a study by Professor John C. Maloney, the acting 
research director of Northwestern University‟s Urban Journalism Center, to suggest 
Portland ranked 21
st
 on a list of “cities most likely to experience racial strife during the 
1968 summer months.”  Portland‟s black demographics (a substantial African-American 
growth rate in a small geographic area) and geography (the covert racism of the North, as 
opposed to the overt racism of the South), had prompted Maloney to rank it rank it as the 
third most likely of all cities west of the Rocky Mountains to see a riot in the summer of 
1968.
19
 
Despite the surprise many Oregonian readers may have had as a result of 
Maloney‟s research, the possibility of additional racial turmoil in Portland had always 
been seen as likely.  The Human Relations Committee, which had published an annual 
retrospective of its goals and successes concerning racial discrimination near the end of 
1967, followed up that January with a report looking ahead to the racial challenges of the 
upcoming year.  Although the previous summer‟s disturbances had not reached riot 
proportions, the document asserted, underlying causes and frustrations remained and 
Portland “might not be as fortunate again.”
20
  “Only the complete removal of race 
discrimination from our community can bring about peace and harmony between all 
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groups,” it concluded.
21
  Such concerns led the Oregon Advance-Times, a black-owned 
Portland newspaper that ran from February to November of 1968, to survey Portlanders 
on the question of whether the city would experience race riots during the coming 
summer, with many respondents answering in the affirmative.
22
 
Eschewing the political talking points often utilized by politicians on the subject 
of racial inequality, the HRC report served as a broadside to Portland‟s deeply entrenched 
racial prejudices.  It acknowledged not only that many legal and civil rights victories on 
behalf of minorities had actually made little difference in everyday lives, but also that it 
was a result of “apathy and a tradition of discrimination,” that such intransigence had 
persisted.
23
  The document also spoke to the way de facto segregation in housing and 
schools denied true participation in the community, providing only “theoretical 
guarantees” of equality.
24
  In confronting the always fragile issue of police-community 
relations, the report was no less straightforward.  Stating “the police officer generally 
represents the authority to maintain the status quo” and that “he thus becomes the logical 
target for those who desire a change,” the HRC suggested that an improvement in police-
community relations was essential to bring about change in a society that had been 
“infected with racial prejudice.”
25
  “This racial prejudice is now being reflected in the 
police establishment,” the report argued.  “The community uses the police to impose a 
value system that is often repugnant to minority group members.”
26
  All efforts to 
challenge the status quo, reform current laws, or change internal power structures, the 
report concluded, would lack any tangible success until the basic issue of prejudice had 
been eradicated.  
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Despite such negative assessments, efforts at equalizing employment 
opportunities for African-Americans within city government continued to take place.  
Citing a statistic indicating that only eight of the city‟s 1,300 fire fighters and police 
officers were black, the State Employment Service of North Portland began efforts to 
recruit and hire greater numbers of African-Americans to participate in those specific 
positions in February 1968.  Acknowledging that many potential black applicants likely 
refrained from applying for such positions as a result of past minor offenses and 
misdemeanors, the State Employment Service overturned its previous requirement 
necessitating a pristine past police record for all applicants, and encouraged all African-
Americans interested in such positions to apply.  “There is a tremendous need for Albina 
community men to serve in the fire and police departments,” stated the Oregon Advance-
Times.  “The city‟s excuse has been that „Negroes just don‟t apply.‟  There is no need for 
this [now].”
27
  
Much as the disturbances within the Albina district had forced Portland to 
acknowledge its own complex relationships concerning race, the March 1968 release of a 
report by President Johnson‟s Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, otherwise 
known as the Kerner Commission Report, did much of the same.  Appointed by the 
president following the rioting in Newark, Detroit, and other cities in the summer of 
1967, the Kerner Commission sought to study the urban racial problems throughout the 
country that had led to such unrest.  Citing numerous reasons for the disharmony present 
throughout many American cities, the Report focused on three key causes: the economic 
marginalization of inner-city African-Americans; institutional racism in areas of 
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employment, housing, and education; and social alienation, particularly as it was present 
in the racial isolation of minorities in their schooling.  
In Portland, the findings were read with a mixture of interest and skepticism.  The 
opening lines to an Oregonian article titled “Race Report Greeted by Enthusiasm, Hope, 
Plus Skepticism on Pertinence to Portland” set the tone.  “It sounds great on paper,” “it 
could change the precarious destiny of America,” and “just words from another 
committee in Washington” represented the range of anonymous responses by Portland‟s 
black community members.
28
  Portland‟s leading officials replicated the response they 
had delivered during the Albina disturbances by attempting to downplay the report‟s 
findings, disconnecting the Kerner Commission conclusions from Portland‟s own racial 
issues.  Despite learning in a memo nearly a month earlier “that some of our thinking on 
our own local problems are not far out of line with the thinking of the Advisory 
Committee,” Mayor Schrunk backed away from tying Portland to the racism detailed in 
the report.  “I don‟t identify our problems in race relations in Portland with those cited by 
the commission, but I think we should study the report with open minds in hopes of 
finding recommendations that would be applicable to our problems,” he declared shortly 
after the report‟s publication.
29
  Chief of Police McNamara, echoing Schrunk‟s 
skepticism, was hesitant to connect the Kerner Report‟s findings to Portland‟s own racial 
problems.  “If the proposed jobs for unemployed Negroes are simply governmental 
make-work positions on a city, county, state or federal payroll,” warned McNamara, 
“they may likely engender only more bitterness – the opposite intended effect.”
30
 Going 
even further, the police chief suggested that white leaders and the city‟s black population 
might best be served in “unobtrusive quietness.”
31
  Less prominent city officials such as 
 
 
65 
Isadore Maney, who served as the manager of the State Department of Employment‟s 
Albina office, saw other benefits to the report, stating that while the recommendations 
and suggested implementations it included were not likely to be funded, the message the 
report contained was much more powerful.  “I understand the scare tactics used by the 
commission and maybe they‟ll do some good in shaking Portland out of its lethargic 
state,” declared Maney.  “Sometimes if a fellow hollers long enough, the right ears hear 
the message.”
32
 
Among community activists, the report was largely seen as satisfying, providing 
credence and validation to the argument that institutional racism was endemic to Portland 
and other cities.  Rev. Paul Schulze, a founder of C-Cap, and long-time city activist, 
seemingly gratified by the commission‟s findings, asked if the white community had “the 
strength to accept the report and respond effectively” or whether it would take “some 
more prodding, some more burning?”
33
  E. Shelton Hill, Executive Director of Portland‟s 
Urban League, referencing the report‟s comparison of race relations in urban American to 
that of South African apartheid, warned that should activists and citizens in Portland not 
follow through on its recommendations, they would face “a very tragic situation, and 
probably one of the most crucial in our history.”
34
  An Op-Ed in the Oregon Advance-
Times was even blunter. “We hope our own mayor will review this report and will be 
among those mayors that are tuned in and recognizing a problem that exists that calls for 
immediate action to wipe out the cause – the cause being white racism,” the editors 
declared.
35
 
The assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in Memphis, Tennessee on April 4, 
1968 at the hands of James Earl Ray, a southern white supremacist, precipitated 
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immediate rioting in over forty major American cities, leading to over twenty fatalities.
36
  
While Portland did not experience any of the large-scale disturbances that afflicted other 
urban centers, King‟s murder played a prominent role in reigniting much of the anger and 
bitterness seemingly suppressed since the outbreaks of the previous summer.  The 
assassination also fueled a renewed and furious debate over the role that violence could, 
and should, play within the black community. 
Anticipating the likelihood that the devastation of King‟s assassination might 
trigger violence throughout Portland, many state and city civic leaders worked to diffuse 
the situation.  Urging non-violence, Governor Tom McCall pleaded that Portlanders look 
to King‟s martyrdom as an adherent of non-violence “in the long hot summer ahead.”
37
  
Mayor Schrunk, articulating a desire for blacks and whites to recommit themselves to 
racial reconciliation, expressed a hope that anger would not be poorly directed.  “I would 
hope that people of all races would recognize this as an act of violence that cannot be 
tolerated in this nation and that black and white citizens will not use this tragedy as an 
excuse for additional acts of violence,” he declared.
38
  Rev. Schulze, in contrast, took a 
more militant position. Schulze insisted that King‟s assassination reflected a “sickness” 
inherent in the separated societies America was building.  “If we continue to resist the 
efforts of the black people to claim their stake in our land,” he warned, “we will be 
headed for self-destruction as a nation.”
39
   Mayfield Webb, executive director of 
Portland‟s Metropolitan Steering Committee, also lamented America‟s violent reputation.  
“I wonder what we must look like to other nations with our habit of killing off this sort of 
man,” he mourned.  “As the nonviolent voices are stilled again and again are they not 
opening the door to other voices,” asked Webb?
40
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The immediate reaction of Portland African-American leaders such as Webb to 
King‟s death was anguish, as well as a renewed dedication to equality and harmony.  
Thomas Vickers proposed expediting and reigniting efforts to increase black employment 
to “alleviate racial tensions and strife” that otherwise might simply be used to “suppress 
disturbances.”
41
 Rozell Gilmore of the Albina Neighborhood Service Center was 
somewhat blunter.  “The possibility of violence has increased tremendously,” he implied.  
“King was the one man who could have calmed this country down this summer.”
42
 
Jimmy Walker, the editor of the Portland Clarion-Defender, another of Portland‟s black 
newspapers, warned against violence in and from the black community, advocating 
continued non-violence to achieve goals of equality.  “Forgive the white race for the 
unjust things they have done to us in the past,” Walker wrote in an editorial 
commemorating King, “and work to fulfill Dr. King‟s wishes by gaining our just place in 
society, by taking advantage of the schools and opportunity available to everyone.”
43
 E. 
Sheldon Hill, a friend of King‟s who had brought the civil rights leader to Portland to 
speak in 1961, simply said the nation would never again be the same as a result of King‟s 
work.
44
  By nearly all accounts, the positive steps that had been made between blacks and 
whites in Portland in the months following the Albina disturbances or, at the very least, 
the tacit agreement to submerge their greatest grievances, had, in the wake of the tragedy, 
been eviscerated.   
A group of clergymen, led by Rabbi Emanuel Rose of Temple Beth Israel, 
distressed by the possibility of civic deterioration, attempted to use their stature as 
religious leaders to bring about positive change. Pressuring Mayor Schrunk to use King‟s 
Sunday memorial service for a much more forceful statement on the problematic racial 
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issues in Portland than in the past, the leaders urged the mayor to show the community 
that the city would provide leadership to help solve the racial problems created by white 
society.
45
  Rose stressed that opportunities were needed to educate a white community 
who failed to even recognize that problems ever existed.
46
 Rev. John H. Jackson, an 
African-American minister from Mt. Olivet Baptist Church, perceiving that the mood of 
the city was ripe with “unity and Christian relationship,” suggested that the mayor 
capitalize on the “conscience stricken” whites in Portland by giving a speech 
recommitting the city to achieving further black gains in jobs, housing, and education.
47
 
The clearest divide over how to once again proceed toward efforts of racial 
reconciliation occurred within the younger demographics of the city‟s African-American 
population.  Many younger residents living in the the Albina community, as well as 
emerging black militants aggrieved by King‟s killing, responded with inflamed rhetoric 
and hostility.  Tom Wilson, an employment counselor at the Albina Neighborhood 
Service Center, predicted violence as retaliation for King‟s death:  “This is the spark that 
will set America on fire like a box of matches … The black man will not stand still and 
be shot like pigs in a pig pen … I don‟t believe in violence, but I believe in meeting force 
with force.”
48
  Dennis Payne, president of the Black Student Union at Portland 
Community College, read a statement claiming to represent the views of the United Black 
Front of Portland, a coalition of twenty-one black organizations. African-Americans must 
“never look back, never stop, and never worry” in their “struggle for and to gain the 
freedoms, the rights, and the justice that our black brother Martin Luther King died for,” 
by “any means necessary,” the statement declared.
49
  Frank Fair, who convened the press 
conference, spoke tersely and combatively to questioning members of the white press, 
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before asking all non-black reporters and observers to leave the room.  When only a black 
television commentator, a black radio reporter, and the publisher of a Negro weekly 
newspaper remained, Fair continued the press conference.
50
  
 Despite such predictions of violence and heightened racial antagonism following 
King‟s death, the only immediate indications of strife in the city occurred at Jefferson 
High School, an Albina area school in which nearly forty percent of the 1,700 students 
were African-American.
51
  Given the substantially large number of black students at 
Jefferson, racial discord had become somewhat commonplace between both teachers and 
students in the years and months leading to King‟s death.  An Oregon Advance-Times 
article nearly two months before the assassination titled, “The Problems at Jefferson 
High; What are the Answers?” spoke to burgeoning tensions between two black members 
of the student body and their predominantly white school administration.  Focusing on 
the legitimacy of Black Student Unions in a high school, the role of African-American 
history in the curriculum, and the perception of racial inequities in school discipline, the 
article illuminated many of the same strains occurring throughout society at-large.  An 
Op-Ed in the Oregon Advance-Times by a Jefferson High School senior in February of 
1968 was particularly tough on the school‟s administration, stating that “certain members 
of the faculty and staff at Jefferson are undermining and destroying the very values and 
qualities that high school are supposed to be developing.”
52
  Rather than providing and 
educating the student for the future, the reader saw the role of the administrator as 
causing far greater harm than good.  “They destroy ideals, stifle creativity, frustrate 
ambition, and make human relations difficult, if not impossible,” the protestor declared.
53
   
 
 
70 
Despite the symbolic flying of the flag at half mast outside the school to honor 
King‟s commitment to nonviolent unity, many of the students inside Jefferson embodied 
the resentment and hostility felt in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy.  Having 
anticipated the possibility of trouble throughout the school day, administrators had 
increased the number of police in an effort to deter possible unrest.  Despite this 
precaution, however, it was immediately apparent to teachers and administrators that the 
day would produce difficulties.  “The biggest problem was that half the students would 
not go to classes,” said Mike Stipac, the school‟s Vice-Principal.  “[They] were just 
milling around the halls threatening trouble.”
54
 
After a morning fight sent a fifteen year-old student, Shirley Griffin, to the 
hospital with a hip injury sustained from a fall down a flight of stairs, tensions within the 
school rose.
55
  Four small fires set in the school‟s science lab, as well as a garbage can 
fire in the music department, necessitated the calling of the fire department, which led to 
the forced evacuation of the school‟s 1,530 students.
56
  Additionally, according to The 
Oregonian, small numbers of African-American students reported to have been chanting, 
“They‟ve killed our leader” throughout the school‟s hallways, referencing the previous 
day‟s assassination of King by a white man.
57
 
   Nathan Proby, a youth worker in the Albina area and an African-American police 
officer, was prominently and strategically placed within the school halls by 
administrators in an effort to institute trust in the law enforcement workers patrolling the 
building.  Familiar with many of the students who were actively participating in 
misbehavior that Friday, Proby spoke frankly:  “I know a lot of these kids and told about 
60 of them to go home – be gone.  Most of these kids are good kids, but there are a few 
 
 
71 
bad apples like anyplace else.”
58
  Don Barrett, a community worker and liaison to 
Jefferson High School, argued that while there was unrest throughout the early morning, 
administrators and community members had expected worst.  “We anticipated more 
trouble than this, and we‟re very pleased that it was only minor.”
59
  Part of this success, 
according to Barrett, came as a result of the efforts of civic-minded Jefferson students of 
both races, who, sensing the potential for a riot, attempted to ratchet down the animosity.  
According to that Friday‟s Oregonian, Jefferson High was the only public school in 
Portland that had been affected by such fraught racial tension. 
After the events of the morning, and anticipating the difficulties of trying to hold 
afternoon classes, school administrators reluctantly dismissed students from school early 
Friday afternoon.  In the aftermath of the dismissal, a large group of students from 
Jefferson proceeded to loiter around the area near the school, moving as far as NE 
Killingsworth St. and Union Ave.
60
  As conflict between the roving group of students and 
neighborhood police officers looked to be escalating, requests were made for additional 
police units, who arrived in time to find a small segment of people engaged in throwing 
rocks at police and law enforcement vehicles.  By mid-afternoon, and shortly after the 
window of a police car had been broken by a thrown rock, the groups of students 
dispersed for good.
61
 
On the following day, Saturday, April 6
th
, two days after King‟s death, Assistant 
Superintendant of Portland Schools Lawrence E. Winter announced that, as a “tribute to 
Dr. King and his contribution to the nation,” Jefferson High School would be closed the 
following Monday and Tuesday.
62
  Stating that while Jefferson was the only Portland 
school that garnered consideration for closure, and that phone calls from parents in other 
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districts indicated that they were opposed to cancelling classes, Winter and school board 
member Howard L. Cherry conceded that students in other Portland high schools could 
also remain home during those two days provided their parents excused the absence.
63
  In 
a statement to the press, Winter recommended that all Portlanders use the days off to pay 
their respects to Dr. King and his causes by participating in memorial services, family 
discussions, or church programs.
64
 
While the suspension of classes at Jefferson was, according to press reports, to 
honor Dr. King‟s legacy, many others saw the school‟s closing as a concession that 
budding racial tensions had engulfed the school‟s administration.  Ted Yaw, the chairman 
of the school board, upon hearing of the school closure, asserted that the prime 
motivation for the closure was “to let racial tensions ease.”
65
  Howard Cherry, while not 
acknowledging the role race played in the decision, did allude to it an article in The 
Oregonian. “‟No other high school is more than 10 percent Negro,‟ he explained, „and all 
were calm Friday except Grant High School where two trash can fires were reported.‟”
66
  
Another Portland school board member, R.W. de Weese, confessed to being puzzled by 
the board‟s decision to close the school, and said he was unaware of any racial tension 
that might have played a motivating role in it.
67
 
The uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding the decision to close Jefferson 
ultimately served as a precursor to a statement the following day opening the school back 
up. Declaring that Jefferson would hold all regular classes on Monday and all morning 
classes on Tuesday, School Board Chairmen Yaw and Portland Asst. Supt. Winter stated 
that any reservations and concerns parents might have regarding student safety were 
unfounded.  “Adequate supervision will be provided through the cooperation of parent, 
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school and community groups to assure safety of all personnel,” the statement noted.
68
  
While Yaw and Winter initially refused comment on the impetus behind the 
administrators‟ change of mind, Howard L. Cherry, a school board member, stated that a 
special board meeting had been held a day earlier in response to complaints from many 
Jefferson area parents and residents that they were being treated differently than others in 
the city.  After listening to the arguments Jefferson area parents made, the Board 
ultimately decided to overturn the school‟s two-day closure in favor of a half-day 
suspension of classes on Tuesday morning in a gesture meant to honor Dr. King.
69
   
The atmosphere at Jefferson High School that Monday, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, proved to be relatively mundane.  While the throwing of a Molotov cocktail into 
the building the night before seemed a possible indication of things to come, the presence 
of additional on-duty police officers, volunteer parents, and temporary community aides 
placed throughout the school halls and classrooms led to a docile setting in which most 
students went through their day quietly.  By mid-day, only half of Jefferson High 
School‟s 1,700 students had arrived, likely the result of confusion generated by the 
school board over the weekend.  “Apparently, they‟re kids who just found out we‟re 
having classes today after all,” remarked Principal William Knouff.
70
  
Despite the ordinary nature of the school environment that Monday, concerns 
over the potential for future violence among students and staff prompted additional action 
from the Portland School Board.  In an executive session following a meeting with 
Mayor Schrunk, the school board, with the blessing of Chief of Police McNamara, 
dictated to Superintendant Melvin Barnes that he arrange for additional police protection, 
community aides, and whatever other necessities would be needed at Jefferson to control 
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unrest.  “We‟re going to give the Jefferson administration what it needs to control the 
situation,” stated Board Member John C. Beatty, Jr., “even if we have to sell some 
property to get the money.”  At the root of the problems at Jefferson, argued Principal 
Knouff, were thirty to forty “hard core” boys between sixteen and twenty-one years old.  
“I can‟t believe we are going to let 30 or 40 boys disrupt a fine school like Jefferson – 
and the whole city,” Knouff stated.  “We can‟t have fear reign among residents out there.  
We already have a flight of white people to the suburbs from that area.  It frightens 
me.”
71
  Echoing Knoff‟s reference to changing racial demographics of the area, Chairmen 
Ted Yaw went even further, stating that in two to three years, all the Jefferson Students 
would be black unless steps were taken.
72
   
Finding themselves unanimously supported by the board in efforts to control and 
deter unrest, Knouff and Barnes recommended that North Commercial and North Kerby 
Avenues, the main streets running by the school, be sealed off during all hours when 
school was in session.  Such an action, claimed the men, would combat efforts by 
suspended and expelled students, as well as visitors from other schools, who drove and 
loitered by the school in an effort to undermine authorities.  City Attorney Alex Brown, 
however, quickly dismissed the idea stating that it was extremely difficult to deny use of 
an entire street to city residents who needed to use it. 
While school administrators and board members were united in much of the 
decision-making at the Monday night meeting, Jefferson High teachers had a separate list 
of issues for discussion.  R.O. Smith, speaking as the social studies supervisor for the 
district schools, spoke to the board about the disparate treatment of African-Americans in 
many of the textbooks being used, or being considered for use, in the fifth, seventh, and 
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eleventh grade social studies classes. In searching for textbooks for future years, Smith 
asserted that “One of our major problems now is to separate good material from what is 
sheer junk.”
73
  Supt. Barnes, while non-committal in changing district policy, did 
acknowledge that “most textbooks have said too little about the Negro‟s place in 
American history and some have said the wrong things.”
74
   
Charles Harris, representing the Portland Federation of Teachers and voicing 
concerns over teacher safety at the school, lobbied the board to provide insurance for the 
medical costs and salary losses of any teacher who might be physically assaulted at the 
school, causing them to miss work, as well as insurance covering private property, such 
as cars, on the off chance they were damaged by students.  Following Harris‟ 
presentation, however, board member John C. Beatty quickly rejected the proposition, 
arguing that such actions weren‟t likely to occur in the future tabling the discussion for a 
future meeting.
75
 
The concerns of teachers such as Smith and Harris served as two of the many 
examples of problems still facing Portland‟s black and white residents.  As displeasure 
over the perceived double standards at Jefferson High School continued throughout that 
school year and into the summer, many African-Americans, perpetually aggrieved by 
perceptions of themselves as part of a permanent second class, continued to feel thwarted.  
Much of Portland‟s predominantly white society saw community violence not as a 
product of institutionalized racism but rather as a product of changing racial 
demographics, the emergence of aggressive black militant movements, and the enabling 
of politicians such as President Johnson and his liberal domestic policies.   
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On volatile urban issues such as housing, education, and unemployment, inequalities 
between the races continued to widen, while any substantive dialogue concerning how to 
fix such chasms faltered.  In June of 1968, however, a detailed analysis of the realities of 
Portland‟s racial problem, which had been vaguely alluded to and suggested in the 
findings of the Kerner Report that March, came barreling to the forefront. 
Anticipating the release of the Kerner Report in March, the City Club of Portland, 
a nonprofit, nonpartisan civic organization formed in 1916 with the goal of researching 
and debating social and governmental policy in the city, formed a Committee of Racial 
Justice to “respond in terms of the Portland community to the report.”
76
  Having 
previously written an informational report titled “The Negro in Portland: A Progress 
Report 1945 – 1957,” the City Club‟s response to the Kerner Report, “Problems of Racial 
Justice in Portland,” served as the Club‟s first foray back into the topic of race relations 
in Portland in eleven years.  Focusing on eight specific areas, among them employment 
and economic opportunities, police and law enforcement, education, and housing, the 
report maintained that one common denominator, “the neglect of citizen involvement,” 
was prevalent in each problem area, and served as an essential factor in characterizing the 
local government.  “It encompasses the failure on the part of local government to 
establish and maintain lines of effective communication with the citizens it serves,” the 
report stated, “and, most significantly, with the residents of Albina and other depressed 
areas.”
77
  This lack of involvement, according to the document, created both 
misunderstanding and a sense of inferiority among the city‟s African-Americans, as it 
related to their interactions with the city.  “Actions taken „for‟ them are readily translated 
by them as actions taken „on‟ or „at‟ or „against‟ them,” it stated.  “Thus, hostilities are 
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aggravated, indignities are multiplied and the failure of citizen-government 
communication is compounded.”
78
 
The City Club report concluded that, despite population, demographic, and 
geographic differences between Portland and many other major urban areas, the contents 
in the Kerner Report could be applied to Portland.  In fact, in many respects, the report 
argued, the relatively small population of the African-Americans in Portland enhanced 
the significance of Kerner‟s findings.  Most notably, unlike major metropolitan areas in 
cities such as Los Angeles, Detroit, and Chicago, the comparatively small number of 
black residents in Portland made it easier for the city‟s much larger white population to 
forget about, neglect, and ignore the Albina district and the problems within it.  
Additionally, the report stated that because of its smaller size, blacks in Portland were 
likely more permissive of the discrimination they faced to a degree that much larger 
populations of African Americans were not. Lastly, the City Club argued that while the 
problems within the Albina community were not qualitatively different than those in 
other cities, the fact that they were smaller, just by sheer size of the black community, 
made continued intransigence by white officials and city leaders to identify and correct 
them, inexcusable.
79
 As E. Kimbark McColl, a member of the study committee that 
prepared the report stated when it was released, “What this report really states is that the 
white, moderate, responsible Portland is where the trouble lies.”
80
  
In concluding their assessment of Portland, the report stated that the tensions and 
unrest present in much larger communities existed in Portland as well.  Weaknesses in 
citizen-government relations were “particularly marked with respect to blighted, 
depressed, or deprived neighborhoods and minority groups, including, very notably, the 
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Albina community.”
81
 Portland was not, as the black community had known all along, 
different than its national counterparts.  As the report stated, to the extent that the 
problems of Portland were dissimilar from those of more prominent racial turmoil, “the 
issue was degree, not of cause and effect, or of urgency.”
82
  Whether such a thoroughly 
analyzed and detailed assessment of the racial problems of the city would be taken 
seriously remained to be seen.  What was apparent, however, was that the avoidance, 
evasion, and benign neglect of the city‟s racial problems by politicians, press, police, and 
citizens was no longer a sustainable strategy. 
Despite the adoption of the sixty-one page report on June 13, there were still 
members of the City Club itself opposed to it.  Rufus Butler, an Albina resident, director 
of the Albina Art Center, and the sole African-American on the study committee before 
resigning from it, not only argued that the club possessed no mandate with which to 
prepare such a report, but also argued that the document was written too quickly in an 
effort to produce a result before the summer.  The effort by the City Club to produce a 
report early enough to release and possibly avert summer disorders, argued Butler, 
ultimately led to a lack of thoroughness in reporting and inaccuracies in the its statistics.  
“The report was not even conducted as it should have been.  The entire research took 
only two months and yet they have taken years to study sanitation problems.”
83
  
Refusing to sign the report because he thought it too mild, Butler also questioned 
why, given the racial composition of the City Club, such an organization felt empowered 
enough to speak on behalf of Portland‟s African-Americans when there were black 
intellectuals and leaders in the city who could, with greater accuracy, meticulously 
present a picture of the African-American community.  “The committee members have 
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no knowledge of black people,” Butler said in an interview with the Oregon Advance-
Times.  “In the report, they stated that they had made an effort to contact the poor, and yet 
there were no poor or even average citizens listed in the back of the book as having ever 
been interviewed.”
84
  Because the report failed to touch upon the central argument of the 
Kerner Commission, that white racism was at the heart of many African-American 
problems, Baker felt the black community would likely be indifferent to its findings and 
find it paternalistic.
85
  “Everything should have been related to white racism, but it was 
not.  They managed to stay in the middle.  They didn‟t talk to black or white extremists.  
They played it safe.”
86
 
Other criticisms of the report by City Club members struck many of the same 
tones.  Dr. William Levin described the report as both prejudicial and destructive, and 
questioned why the mayor had not been interviewed for the inquiry, given that it indicts 
the city government‟s inaction on problems of race.  When Levin requested that the 
report be sent back to the committee for future work and research, his request was ruled 
out of order.  A request for postponement of consideration of the report, also made by 
Levin, was also voted down.
87
 
Responding to the City Club of Portland report that African-American jobs, more 
than anything else, was integral to solving the problems related to housing, education, 
and public welfare, Portland‟s city commissioners disputed the findings, calling it an 
“indictment” of City Hall.
88
 In a press conference called by Stanley Earl, the 
commissioners described the report as “shallow … inflammatory … irresponsible … 
inaccurate, misleading, and divisive,” and suggested that some of the accusations made 
against the police bureau were libelous.
89
 Himself a member of the City Club, Earl 
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complained that the civic organization failed to interview a single elected official or 
ranking member of the fire or civil service board, and fiercely resisted the report‟s 
insinuation that the fire bureau, which was directly under his jurisdiction, engaged in 
either discriminatory behavior or indifference toward black applicants.  Speaking on 
behalf of Police Chief McNamara‟s input, Earl stated that despite greater efforts by the 
police bureau, the recruitment of African-Americans had largely been unsuccessful 
because the job had stigmatized by the black community.  Furthermore, Earl maintained 
that African-Americans were not harassed or subjected to slower response times on 
police calls, and that any issues of police brutality or abuse by an officer should be seen 
as an indictment of the individual officer, rather than the force at large.
90
 
Commissioner William A. Bowes, speaking to the report‟s conclusions on issues 
of black employment, stated that issues facing African-Americans would “not be solved 
by shallow studies, followed by inflammatory and irresponsible statements,” while 
Commissioner Ivancie described the report as “long on the Kerner Report and short on 
facts about Portland.”  Ivancie stated that efforts to single out the city as prejudiced in its 
hiring and employment practices was “grossly unfair,” and cited the fifty blacks 
employed in the parks bureau, as well as the thirty blacks who worked in the public 
works, as evidence that contradicted the report.
91
 
As the City Club Report continued to be read and digested by Portlanders in the 
aftermath of its release, the conclusions and ultimate meaning of the document underwent 
intense scrutiny.  An Oregon Journal article written on June 17th titled “Generalizations 
Hit in City Club Report,” the last in a series of articles printed that week focusing on 
racial justice, acknowledged that much of the City Club Report, and particularly sections 
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concerning data on public welfare, were general in nature and lacked the specificity to 
draw the conclusions it did.  Nevertheless, the article was quick to condemn those who 
focused so narrowly on minor inaccuracies that they missed its overarching messages.  
The fact that so many law enforcement officials, public authorities, and city officials 
reacted so defensively to criticism of their programs and behavior “is evidence that here, 
too, the specter of „white racism‟ – the insidious, subconscious kind that is the greatest 
threat – is not recognized by the „good white folks‟ who practice it,” asserted Oregonian 
writer Morton Spence.
92
  An Oregon Advance-Times op-ed from June 20
th
 titled 
“Criticism in City Club Report Found to Be Valid,” while also finding fault with some of 
the report‟s claims, ultimately acknowledged that much of the conclusions concerning the 
presence of prejudice in Portland were accurate. 
The City Club‟s report on race in Portland loomed large over much of the summer 
of 1968.  Various efforts by politicians, civic groups, and activist organizations to 
confront issues of racial prejudice and improve city policy, were viewed, both by the 
participants and the observers, against the backdrop of the city‟s purported white racism.  
 Black Summer, an educational program in the Albina district aimed at teaching black 
history to neighborhood youths in a less structured academic environment, implicitly 
became seen through a prism of race when the program‟s director stated that area streets 
must be cordoned for the project so that participants “don‟t have to worry about having 
their brains blown out by pigs.”
93
 Mayor Schrunk, visiting Chicago for the United States 
Conference of Mayors, where he was installed as the new president, echoed both reports 
and used the opportunity to address the comparisons of Chicago and Portland ghettos.  “I 
shall go back to Portland to work even harder to correct some of the problems we have 
 
 
82 
there, to make a similar occurrence there impossible,” he declared.
94
  Even the Portland 
police department, attempting to foster a better relationship with Albina youth, hired ten 
black teenagers who were tasked with creating “a better understanding between the police 
department and Albina residents.”
95
  
While shifts in policy among Portland‟s political class enhanced the image of the 
police department with the public, their efforts to bridge the divide with the black 
community were ultimately disingenuous.  Leaders such as Mayor Schrunk spoke of 
working with the community to confront the problems facing Albina yet the city‟s police 
force continued to increase its surveillance of local civil rights activists, often working to 
“link him or her to various illegal activities until they found a charge that would stick.”
96
 
While Portland‟s efforts at monitoring individuals it deemed to be subversive had begun 
in the mid-1960s, the FBI‟s expansion of its own counter-intelligence program 
(COINTELPRO) to a number of states, including Oregon, in March of 1968, provided the 
local police officers with a legitimacy it previously lacked.  Armed with federal backing, 
local FBI agents began engaging in efforts to disrupt and intimidate the movements, 
organizations, and individuals they saw as threatening the status quo.
97
 
 On July 11
 
and October 7, as part of the Government People – People to the 
Government program, the Mayor and City Council members held “little city hall” 
programs aimed at giving citizens an opportunity to ask city leaders about the services the 
city provides, as well as the functions of the city government.  Aimed at eroding the 
perception of a city government out of touch with their citizens, and particularly their 
constituents in the Albina district, the events were open to any member of the 
community.   
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 Heavily advertised in the newspapers, hyped by word of mouth, and open to all, 
the dialogue between citizens and their elected leaders proved to be terse, brusque, and, at 
times, contentious.  At the first “little city hall,” hosted by Buckman Elementary School 
in SE Portland, the indifference of the city commissioners, and particularly 
Commissioner Ivancie, brought displeasure to many in the community. One attendee, 
feeling disrespected by the demeanor of the commissioners, demanded increased input by 
citizens.  “We could receive better answers.  We vote you in,” the man argued.  “You are 
dealing with people – not animals.  You can‟t tell us – you ask us.”
98
  At the October 
meeting, this time at Boise Elementary School in the Albina district, the first time a “little 
city hall” had been held in the area, emotions again ran high when the conversation 
turned to police behavior in black neighborhoods.  “I have more respect for prostitutes 
than your officers on the police department,” declared R.L. Anderson.  “You say you 
tried … In all seriousness you know the game.  You better start hearing their trouble.  
You have been warned – told – asked – and baited – the citizen.  The black people want a 
fair shake in Portland.”
99
  While certain issues raised by Albina residents at the meeting 
were settled, the meeting ultimately ended in the same manner as many others - a 
stalemate.   
 As Albina residents continued to voice their frustrations to city leaders, the police 
persevered with their efforts to marginalize their own constituents.  The Police 
Community Relations Unit, set up earlier in the year to improve police-community 
relations, had done little to foster improvement.  Despite earlier hopes that the PCR Unit 
would provide civilian oversight of police activities in Albina, it soon became clear that 
police officers never wanted, and would never allow, such oversight to occur.  “Top 
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echelon men want to keep it [the police bureau] twenty-five years behind the times,” 
stated a member of the Metropolitan Human Rights Commission.
100
 
New laws to curb prejudice, a renewed commitment to civil rights activism, an 
honest assessment of the role of racial prejudice, and an open dialogue between city 
leaders and their constituents had all, to one extent or another, wilted in the face of the 
status quo.  If the aftermath of the 1967 disturbances had brought renewed efforts at 
improving race relations in the city, a year later a candid appraisal of such labors could 
only be judged as falling short.  Whether blame was to fall on the absence of political 
will, insufficient economic means, an entrenched and antiquated perspective on race, or 
the passivity of the demands for racial justice, no one could be certain.  But without 
seismic changes to Portland, any efforts to improve upon the standing relations between 
the races would be seriously thwarted. 
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Chapter 4: Blow-up (1969) 
 As Portland residents and officials continued their efforts to improve city race 
relations, an increasingly contentious national racial atmosphere brought on by the rise of 
Black Nationalist groups such as the Black Panther Party for Self Defense, a self-defined 
revolutionary organization that attempted to curb police brutality towards African-
Americans, began to indirectly affect local events.   
In May of 1968, a group of forty men and ten women, led by University of 
Washington student Aaron Dixon, officially established a chapter of the Black Panther 
Party (BPP) in Seattle.  Portland‟s black-owned Oregon-Advance Times was the lone 
newspaper in the City of Roses to cover the event.  “The Black Panther Party for Self-
Defense is moving closer to Portland,” the newspaper proclaimed.  Citing a long history 
of racial segregation, discrimination, and neglect, the Advance Times pointedly noted the 
similarities between the racial climates of the two main cities of the Pacific Northwest.
1
 
While Portland had succumbed to instances of racial turmoil such as the Irving 
Park disturbances of 1967, the city had successfully avoided the major racial altercations 
and clashes that had marred many American cities.  Nevertheless, Portland police officers 
continued to confront the more radical elements of the African-American community.  In 
July 1968, the police were notified of a plan by unnamed individuals living in the Albina 
district to instigate a racial uprising.  Alerted to the scheme by an informant, officers 
understood that the uprising was to take place during the last weekend of July in 
retaliation for what the perpetrators believed had been the physical assault of a black girl 
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by a white cop.
2
 While the racial uprising never took place, the clandestine manner in 
which such large-scale plans seemed to have been formulated and disseminated 
throughout the community elucidated the difficulties faced by city police in curbing racial 
discord.  Other efforts towards violence made by more militant members of the black 
community, such as the intimidation and threatening of business owners and the targeting 
of businesses for firebombing, served as further proof of the schism not only amongst 
Albina‟s old guard, represented by the predominantly black business owners of the 
district, and their angrier and more militant younger counterparts, but also in the 
acceptable tactics and strategies of the civil rights movement nationwide. 
As racial tensions within Albina continued to fester, the long-term effect of the 
antagonisms between the area‟s older blacks, younger blacks, and city police wrought 
previously unforeseen problems.  In the aftermath of the disturbances of 1967, businesses 
along Albina‟s busiest thoroughfare, Union Avenue, fearful of firebombing attempts and 
future vandalism, began to protect their businesses by placing wood and steel boards 
along windows facing the street.  Such “anti-riot” décor, while purportedly keeping the 
workers and patrons of such businesses safe, also created the appearance of an 
unwelcoming neighborhood, further depressing the area‟s real estate and discouraging 
new investment.  Worsening the problem, many businesses within the area, frustrated by 
the cost and symbolism of the outfitting repairs needed to stay there, saw opportunities to 
relocate to less volatile parts of the city, where damage to their business was not likely to 
occur.  Insurance companies, forced to pay claims on the $50,000 worth of damage that 
occurred in Portland during the 1967 disturbances, began refusing to renew policies in the 
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area, discouraging affected businesses to remain.
3
  Marvin McKinney, Jr., a local 
insurance agent, stated that “an unwritten law” existed in the insurance industry “not to 
write policies” for segments of Albina following the Irving Park disturbances.
4
 Once 
thought of as having the potential to be one of the most progressive and innovative 
neighborhoods of the city, Albina in 1969 remained stunted by many of the same 
problems that had plagued it over the earlier years of the decade. 
While black unemployment, substandard housing, and de facto segregation in the 
local schools tended to dominate the grievances of many of Albina‟s residents, it was the 
contentious and volatile relationship between the community and the police that 
ultimately led to a second violent collision in Albina less than two years after the first.  
Despite efforts by city officials and local civil rights advocates to improve police-
community relations, tensions in Northeast Portland in the late 1960s between police and 
African-Americans were perilous.  Jimmy “Bang-Bang” Walker, a civil rights advocate, 
African-American journalist, and editor of The Clarion-Defender, one of two black 
newspapers in Portland at the time, routinely used his newspaper to expose purported 
police brutality.  In an October 1968 editorial titled “Ghetto Tactics,” Walker recounted 
an episode in which Officer Clark Paul, a white male police officer, had both struck an 
elderly black woman during a traffic stop, while simultaneously threatening to arrest 
Walker for attempting to intervene.  “It was reminiscent of the way George Wallace plans 
to handle police matters involving black people,” observed Walker.
5
   
Other accounts of police harassment, detailed in the City Club of Portland‟s 
Report on Law Enforcement, 1968, highlighted the manner in which officers who 
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patrolled the area treated Albina residents.  The police were consistently slow to respond 
to the neighborhood when requested by residents threatened with violence, and would 
often refer to black males as “‟boy‟ and other derogatory names” when they did.  
Moreover, officers would routinely stop black motorists throughout the neighborhood 
without cause or suspicion, often targeting interracial couples for questioning and 
frequently engaging in verbal abuse.  “My wife was stopped by the police on night 
around 11 p.m.” recounted one black interviewee in the Report.  “He came to the car and 
said, „Where are you going, Bitch?‟”  An attorney interviewed for the City Club Report 
stated that he felt it was police policy to engage in the practice of targeting and stopping 
black residents on the basis of their race alone.
6
 
Kent Ford and Percy Hampton, Portland black activists who would co-found the 
city‟s chapter of the Black Panther Party in the summer of 1969, saw the police as 
unabashedly detrimental to the African-American community. In July 1968, while 
walking to the grocery store, Hampton was stopped by a police car.  “„Boy, where you 
going?‟”, Hampton recalled the officer as demanding.  “‟My name is not boy,‟” Hampton 
responded, before being attacked for insolence and placed in jail for ninety days under an 
assault charge.
7
  Such behavior by the police, according to Ford, fed the resentment that 
allowed the Black Panthers to flourish.  “I can count on one hand the people we actually 
recruited,” stated Ford.  “In those days, the police did most of our outreach.”
8
  This 
antagonistic relationship between the police and local residents served as the backdrop 
for the conflict that took place in Northeast Portland in mid-June of 1969. 
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Late on the night of Friday, June 13, after receiving numerous complaints from 
area residents concerning the throwing of rocks and bottles from rooftops and street 
corners, Portland police officers arrived at the corner of N.E. Union Avenue and Shaver 
Street, where they encountered a large congregation of black youths.  Lidio‟s Drive-In, a 
fast food Italian restaurant which sat at the corner, was one of the businesses in the 
Albina district that chose not to leave the neighborhood following the turmoil of 1967.  
Freely catering to both black and white patrons, the restaurant often became a gathering 
point for Albina‟s youth population, given its central location within the neighborhood, as 
well as its general tolerance for a younger demographic of customers.  Officers Clyde 
Harmon and B.R. Robinson, deeming a fifteen-year old in violation of city curfew laws 
on the night in question, attempted to arrest the youth, an action that precipitated a clash 
between nearly 150 young people and the two officers.
9
  As they sought to place the 
young man into a police car, one of the officers was knocked down and beaten, sustaining 
a cracked rib in the process, while bystanders, according to news reports, taunted the 
officers, physically beat on the police car, and slashed one of the tires in an effort to 
prevent it from driving away, which it eventually did.
10
   
Five additional units were immediately dispatched to the scene while thirteen 
separate units moved into the surrounding area.  Richard Southern, a West Linn High 
School graduate who had been a police officer for only three hours, was one of the first to 
respond.  Arriving to find a crowd of nearly sixty young blacks, Southern and the other 
officers immediately picked up on the root of the gathering‟s displeasure.  “Someone in 
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the crowd yelled, „Get Whitey!‟” Southern told the Oregonian four days after the event.  
“The crowd action was directed; it was not just something that grew.”
11
 
Once police descended upon the area, crowds of young people began throwing 
rocks at the windows of local businesses in a repeat of the vandalism that had taken place 
two years earlier.  Driving along Union Avenue, fifty-two-year old Broadway cab driver 
Thomas J. Kelly was dragged from his car and assaulted by nearly thirty attackers, as his 
vehicle, still in gear, rolled through the front plate-glass window of Weimer‟s Furniture 
store.  Two other motorists that evening, Richard Dowty and passenger Gale Starr, were 
also forcibly removed from their car by a small gang of teenagers, but suffered no serious 
injuries, despite reports they had been assaulted and treated at St. Vincent Hospital.
12
   
An Oregon Journal account of the event stated that shortly after the disturbances 
began, the police engaged in “swift, club-swinging battles with the gangs.”  Larry Brown, 
the Lieutenant of Portland‟s North Precinct, was himself struck in the jaw during the 
conflict, partially the result of police efforts to minimize violence.  “No policeman pulled 
a gun and no shots were fired by us,” Brown said in praise of his men‟s restraint.  Brown 
also acknowledged the efforts of the large number of local residents who attempted to 
force angry youths off the streets and into their homes.  By daylight, as the roving groups 
of attackers finally broken up and dispersed, the clash came to a halt.  Nearly three and a 
half hours after the violence first erupted, the Albina streets were clear, leaving a final 
tally of twelve arrested, twelve injured, and a damage toll to be determined.
13
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Despite the brevity of Friday night‟s disturbance, the détente between law 
enforcement and the community was short-lived, with scattered and destructive violence 
that Saturday night as well.  Having already arrested nearly forty youths late Saturday 
night on charges such as resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and loitering, the police 
found themselves encountering additional problems Sunday night.  On the evening of 
June 15
th
, police officials, sensing the brewing of possible trouble, moved to close down 
the Rose Festival Center in Holladay Park, where a large group of teenagers and adults 
had gathered.  Following the closure of the park around 10:30 p.m., the large group 
relocated nearly two miles away to Lidio‟s Drive-In, which had served as the site of the 
previous day‟s police-civilian clash.
14
  In the ensuing hour, characterized by one police 
officer as an atmosphere of “total unrest,” disorder once again broke out in the area 
surrounding N.E. Union Avenue and Shaver Street. as the police ordered the gathering to 
dissolve.
15
   
As had occurred the night before, small groups of teenagers, moving first towards 
Garfield Street and then to Failing, participated in the breaking of nearly sixty windows 
of nearby businesses, including the Piedmont Pharmacy, Rose City Pharmacy, and 
Grenfell‟s Food Market, while police officers were stationed nearby with shotguns to 
prevent looting.
16
  In contrast to the previous night, however, homes, schools, and 
businesses, including a flower shop and the Albina legal aid office, were victimized by 
firebombs or set fires.
17
  Kennedy Elementary School, located near the corner of N.E. 
33
rd
 and Killingsworth, suffered $1,000 worth of fire damage, while a Molotov cocktail 
thrown through the a window of the Albina legal aid office led to $3,500 worth of 
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damage.
18
  Eventually, police were forced to erect a barricade that stretched across 
Mason and Garfield Streets to prohibit civilian access to fire-starting materials in the fuel 
yards nearby.
19
 
Having established a field headquarters at a nearby McDonald‟s shortly after 
midnight, the nearly fifty police officers, including all off-duty personnel present, began 
making arrests in the Albina district of any individual who refused to disperse upon 
orders to do so.  Despite providing resistance earlier in the evening in the form of kicks, 
punches, and thrown bottles, those remaining in the area generally obeyed orders. By 
1:00 a.m., however, sixteen people had been arrested, including ten juveniles, on charges 
ranging from loitering to assault with a deadly weapon.  By 2:00 a.m, nevertheless 
despite minor reports of newly broken windows, the second night of major conflict in 
Albina had concluded.
20
 
Nearly six hours after the altercation between police and civilians had ended that 
Monday morning, a racially diverse group of nearly fifty people had arrived at the 
downtown police headquarters to protest the jailing of nearly thirty individuals from the 
previous night‟s disturbances.  Protesting peacefully in both the lobby and the corridor 
outside, the group sharply condemned the police‟s handling of the events of the previous 
two nights.  Jimmy (Bang-Bang) Walker of the Northwest Clarion-Defender, an 
eyewitness during the first night of the altercation, blamed use of excessive force by the 
police as the reason for the violence.  “The police got rougher than they should have and 
this is when everything got out of hand,” he stated.  Walker, among others, also disputed 
the police report of the incident, claiming that officers used unnecessary force as soon as 
 96 
they arrived at the scene.  “The police need some training,” urged Walker.  “You need 
policemen who won‟t lose their cool when somebody calls him a pig bastard.”
21
   
Speaking to the Oregon Journal, Walker insisted that a large part of the problem 
centered around the manner in which the police monitored the community, arguing that if 
officers walked the beat daily, as opposed to riding in their patrol cars, their relationship 
with constituents would be much improved.  Kent Ford, a local black activist already well 
known to Portland police officers given his role in previous altercations, and one of the 
twelve arrested during the first night of conflict, criticized the police handling of both the 
disturbance at Lidio‟s Drive-In, as well as their general behavior in the community.  
“People [Albina residents] are going to keep retaliating until the pigs stay out of our 
community,” Ford asserted.  “The pigs [police] have no right in the black community.”  
Ford told the Oregonian that the intentionally falsified police reports of the disturbances 
were the “hogwash of fascist pigs.”
22
  
As African-American activists such as Jimmy Walker and Kent Ford spoke out 
against police behavior, other black leaders joined in with even more sinister 
explanations of official conduct.  Citing the arrest of five local self-identified black 
militants, including Kent Ford, Leon Johnson, a former city police officer, argued that the 
orders were designed to crack down on the most radical activists.  Johnson referenced a 
recent directive by U.S. Attorney General John N. Mitchell targeting African-American 
radicals and stated that he believed the weekend‟s incidents to have been staged to 
achieve similar results.  Like Walker and Ford, Johnson questioned the validity of police 
accounts, arguing that many newsmen only received one side of the story.  “I was a 
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policeman and I know what goes into those reports,” Johnson stated.  “Anything an 
officer wants to write.  If you foul up, you aren‟t going to say so in your report, are 
you?”
23
  Even a black member of Governor Tom McCall‟s staff, speaking on a condition 
of anonymity, accused the Portland police of provoking the weekend‟s violence to 
instigate arrests.
24
 
The narrative of a covert police operation aiming to trap and ensnare Portland‟s 
local black militants received further exposure in a series of articles published in the local 
weekly underground newspaper, The Willamette Bridge. Radical in its ideology and 
content, the Bridge was published between 1968 and 1971 by a group that included 
members of both Reed College‟s Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as well as its 
offshoot, the Portland Revolutionary Youth Movement.
25
 In their July 3rd edition, under 
the headline “Black Community Attacked,” the newspaper insinuated that police 
harassment of the black community had resulted from African-American dissatisfaction 
with the Rose Festival and “it‟s „lily white and good for business‟ orientation that 
depicted prosperity unlike any experienced in the black community.”  The article asserted 
that the police had sought to proactively discourage local black militants from creating a 
disturbance that might disparage the Festival and harm participating businesses.  By 
provoking a confrontation, the Bridge insisted, the police were able to intimidate the 
black community into a more docile role during the Festival, while also having a reason 
to assail the more active and militant African-American members of the Albina district.
26
   
While the Willamette Bridge articles spoke to the potential motivations of the 
Portland police, they also highlighted key discrepancies in the actual facts of the story.  
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Contrary to newspaper reports in the Oregonian and Oregon Journal, or formal police 
reports of the incidents, the Bridge claimed that on Saturday and Sunday, the nights 
following the initial conflict on Friday, drunken police officers without name badges and 
with their car license plates covered, drove around the Albina district beating up black 
teenagers.
27
 In an interview with the Bridge, a source present at the altercations spoke 
bluntly.  “You got people riding around in their cars they call themselves “police,” the 
man said.  “They say they want to kill a nigger.  And on several occasions, they‟ve pulled 
a gun on these niggers.”
28
  Citing the arrests of twenty-one activists in New York City 
and seven more in Oakland, the respondent asserted that the police narrative of a 
disruptive black population in Portland simply didn‟t match the trend.  “They‟re starting 
at the real militant – the Panthers and different organizations, and if they can get them, 
they can bust down and the get then rest of them right down the ranks,” he declared.  
“They don‟t have to get the Negroes and the house niggers to go, „cause they‟re going to 
go willingly.”
29
  
First-hand accounts by George Davis, the black night manager at Lidio‟s Drive-
In, bolstered the narratives presented by Walker, Ford, and, to a far lesser extent, the 
claims made in the Willamette Bridge.  Interviewed in the Oregonian on Tuesday, June 
17
th
, Davis stated that the major conflict on Friday arose when police officers, wearing 
black leather jackets with their nameplates and badges removed, used their clubs to 
subdue two black girls they were attempting to arrest.  Meeting fierce resistance from a 
large group present at the scene, tensions were ratcheted up late Saturday night when 
police began swinging their clubs.
30
  According to the Oregonian account, Davis saw one 
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police officer “put his club around a girl‟s neck and force her into the squad car,” while 
two other officers, in separate incidents, struck two younger males in the head and 
stomach.  According to Davis, such force left one youngster with a broken jaw, another 
with a broken collarbone, and a third with a broken nose.  “After that the kids broke loose 
on them and started throwing rocks and smashing windows,” stated Davis.
31
 
Additional witness accounts of police violence, previously relegated exclusively 
to the city‟s alternative or black newspapers, began to appear in the Oregonian and the 
Oregon Journal as well.  An Oregonian article titled “Albina Dwellers Charge Police 
With Beatings, Harassment,” revealed that a mother and child had been dragged from 
their home in the middle of the night after having their door broken down by police.  The 
newspaper also reported the allegations of a young African-American male who claimed 
he was assaulted with nightsticks before having the cash in his wallet stolen. Dozens of 
young black males, in addition, reported being harassed and assaulted, suggesting at a 
minimum that the narratives of the police and some in the African-American community 
were vastly at odds.  “We‟re going to try to find why so many Albina youngsters have 
been arrested and beat up,” stated Nathan Proby, director of Albina‟s teen center.  “We 
want to know who is to blame, the kids or the police.”
32
    
Despite assertions from outspoken elements of the African-American community, 
police explanations regarding the problems in Albina remained steadfast.  Arguing that 
the problems were the result of rebellious youths who refused to obey police orders, 
Captain William Taylor, the commander of the Police Bureau, stated that the escalation 
was predominantly the result of the attack on the first two police officers who arrived on 
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the scene on the night of June 13th.  “We were forced to call in more men to assist them,” 
argued Taylor.  “Our men were met by defiance and resistance – bottles, bricks, fists, and 
feet.  And that was what set it off.”
33
 Furthermore, Taylor stated, it was the black 
militants, rather than the vast multitude of people in the area, who were to be blamed for 
the troubles.  Citing continual efforts by these groups to attack white officers attempting 
to make arrests in Albina, as well as a purported effort to shut down the Rose Festival, 
Taylor laid the responsibility for the antagonism and acrimony between the two groups at 
the feet of the community‟s militant African-Americans.   
The sentiments expressed in the underground Willamette Bridge represented the 
fundamental antagonism between the city‟s police force and more radical members of the 
community.  While the younger and more militant members of the black population in 
the Albina disturbances of 1967 had been predominantly marginalized by more moderate 
elements, the more recent disturbances seemed to garner more support.  Touched off by 
local accusations of police brutality, a charge that also served as a catalyzing force for 
militant activists nationwide, as opposed to the perceptions of youthful indiscretion, 
vandalism, and outsider agitation that generally characterized the disturbances two years 
earlier, the conflict between police and civilians within the Albina area, while 
neutralized, was certainly not resolved by the afternoon of June 16th. 
As that Monday‟s temperature reached 94 degrees, setting a new high for the year 
to that point, a comparative calm seemed to have settled over the Albina neighborhood. 
Yet as First Lady Pat Nixon, along with her daughter, Julie, toured four separate areas of 
Portland, including the Albina Art Center, as part of a nationwide tour highlighting urban 
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volunteer projects, local police once again geared up for another night of potential 
conflict.
34
  Earlier in the day, as a result of the previous weekend‟s altercations, Don 
Duehart, a local member of the Black Panther party, and R.L. Anderson, a member of the 
Albina Citizens Council, announced that black militants would be patrolling the Albina 
area in marked cars to prevent additional acts of police violence.  Calling Mayor Terry 
Schrunk and Police Chief Donald McNamara “mental incompetents” and demanding 
their removal, Anderson stated that much as the police were armed during their patrol, so 
would their neighborhood guard.
35
   
Cognizant of heightened tensions, the police showed early signs of strength that 
night with patrols around Lidio‟s Drive-In.
36
 Despite reports pointing to a potential 
turnout of a large group of supporters of those arrested and detained the previous night, 
however, Monday night and Tuesday morning produced only a few arrests. One detention 
involved Jimmy Walker, the editor-publisher of the Northwest Clarion Defender.  
Arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest after refusing, on the grounds that he 
was a member of the press, the request of a police officer to move to a different location 
to take pictures of the police clearing a nearby street, Walker claimed to have received 
injuries during his apprehension that prohibited him from appearing at an early Tuesday 
morning hearing at the Municipal Courthouse.  “When they arrested me, I didn‟t resist 
because I felt I was within my rights,” Walker stated from his hospital bed.  “As they 
pushed me into a police car, one officer kept jabbing me with his nightstick … jabbing 
hard.”  The arresting officer, while acknowledging Walker‟s media credentials, indicated 
that the arrest occurred not as a result of Walker‟s refusal to move, but rather as a result 
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of the profanity Walker directed towards him after his request.  “There‟s some fault on 
both sides,” Walker said.  “But it‟s the responsibility of the police to avert violence.”
37
  
As Albina continued to experience disruptions between the police and 
community, Portland Mayor Terry Schrunk delivered a presidential report to the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors 2,500 miles away in Pittsburgh.  Schrunk called upon Congress to 
cede greater authority to local elected officials to find solutions to the urban crises many 
cities faced.  Arguing in opposition to a federal bureaucratic system that slowed down 
real solutions, the mayor spoke candidly about Oregon‟s urban problems.  “I must say 
some states, including my own, have opened their eyes to recognizing the urgency of city 
needs,” Schrunk asserted.
38
  As his own city continued to battle the racial turmoil that had 
plagued the community for two of the past three summers, Schrunk urged national and 
state legislators to move quickly on block grants and other forms of investment that might 
address the critical problems of urban areas.  Most notable, however, he called for an 
increase in federal spending to oppose urban crime while urging city leaders to be 
prepared to “move effectively against problems of disorder and so-called civil 
disobedience.”
39
 
While Schrunk urged city leaders across the nation to be prepared for the 
“problems of disorder” that often arose in urban areas, the mayor‟s own absence from 
Portland during the disturbances left him attempting to provide leadership from the 
opposite side of the country.  Speaking by phone to the Oregonian on Tuesday the 17th, 
less than twenty-four hours after repeating his message to the Conference of Governors, 
Schrunk exuded confidence in his own city‟s handling of its disturbances.  Stating that he 
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had been in contact with the acting Chief of Police throughout the events, the mayor 
claimed that while the policy of city police was to not use any more force than was 
needed when making arrests, he did not expect his officers to back down or retreat when 
threatened.  Schrunk responded to questions regarding charges leveled that police officers 
had entered homes illegally in an effort to catch suspects by maintaining that while he did 
not have all of the facts of the case, it was legal for an officer to enter a home when in 
pursuit of an individual seeking to avoid arrest.  Stating that he would make decisions 
regarding the possible necessity of a city curfew and the closure of specific businesses 
that served as problem areas upon his return, Schrunk reiterated his confidence in the 
police force.  “I will stack our police force against any in the nation – in training, policy, 
and administration,” he declared.
40
 
As Mayor Schrunk defended the behavior of Portland‟s police department across 
the country in Pittsburgh, Police Chief Donald McNamara, who had just returned from a 
law enforcement meeting in Virginia himself, began his own vigorous defense of the 
bureau.  Addressing the allegations of Mrs. Gwen Branch, who had earlier in the week 
accused two police officers of breaking down her door and entering her home without a 
warrant, McNamara reiterated Schrunk‟s contention that officers in pursuit of a suspect 
who entered a home did not need to produce a search warrant.  McNamara also disputed 
claims that Mrs. Branch‟s twelve year old son Stanford Grant had been dragged outside 
the home and arrested.  According to the Chief, police records indicated that Grant had 
been arrested inside the home along with his brother Norman on charges of interfering 
with a police officer.  “The Portland community does not benefit when rumors are spread 
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and tempers are inflamed by an incomplete telling of the facts,” warned McNamara.  “It 
is immaterial that allegations are eventually proved false … The damage is done at the 
moment of telling.”
41
  
As Schrunk, McNamara, and Patrick Carr, who had served as Acting Chief of 
Police during McNamara‟s absence, mounted a vigorous defense of both their officers 
and their conduct during the turmoil of the three nights in Albina, additional accounts 
began to surface.  An Oregonian article titled “Police Point out Innocent Victims of 
Beatings by Youth Gangs Also Deserve Protection” referred to the hypocrisy of black 
militants who, while claiming police brutality on one hand, failed to recognize the 
violence of their own behavior directed at innocent members of the community.  Citing 
instances such as the beating of a man who was eventually left in a nearby gutter; the 
dragging of a cab driver from his own vehicle; and a woman who was stripped naked to 
the waist and verbally insulted by attackers, the feature highlighted the violent nature of 
many of the groups who, in resisting the police, often found themselves assailing others.  
Carr insisted that there had not been enough outrage in the community and media towards 
the agitators.  “We know that whenever you get a bunch of kids together with nothing to 
do, trouble is going to develop,” Carr lamented.  “The victims of violence we‟ve had in 
recent days prove that.  What we‟re trying to do is to protect people in the area – keep 
them from becoming victims.”
42
 
Richard Dowty, the thirty-two year old man mentioned in the article who had 
been assaulted and left in the gutter by his attackers, stated that he had been dragged from 
his car by nearly twenty black youths before he was hit in the head with a soda bottle and 
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then kicked in the head, rendering him unconscious.  Reading news coverage of the 
incident days later, Dowty was outraged by the portrayal of the police as aggressors and 
his attackers as the victims.  “I read that article about police brutality in the newspaper 
and it made me mad,” Dowty told an Oregonian reporter.  “If anything, I feel the police 
have been too soft on those kids.  They should be stricter.  Those kids deserve everything 
they got coming to them.”
43
 
Dale Kenney, another assault victim featured in the article, viewed his attack 
differently from many others in the white community.  Assaulted from behind by six 
teenagers as he walked home from work, Kenney failed to subscribe racial malice to the 
motivation of the perpetrators, stating that such violence was merely endemic of 
contemporary youth culture at that time.  “Something like that can happen anywhere, not 
just in Albina,” Kenney was quoted as saying.  “It happened to me once before in Tigard.  
That time the kids involved were white.”
44
  Kenney stated that until people woke up to 
the problem of community violence in general, such discord would continue to be a part 
of society. 
Despite the upheaval of Albina over the previous few days, much of Tuesday had 
presented a relative calm.  Earlier in the day, at the behest of city law enforcement 
officials, North Precinct Commander Captain William Taylor met with a group of black 
Albina men and agreed to keep all Portland police officers out of the most troubled areas 
of the district for forty-eight hours.  Making the deal with the explicit agreement that, in 
return, the men would use their influence to keep the area trouble-free, Taylor and 
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McNamara saw the concession as a way to begin repairing the relationship between 
police and civilians.   
Despite the agreement, and an uneventful afternoon and early evening, the arrival 
of nighttime once again brought trouble.  Far from remaining untouched, Albina 
businesses suffered a significant amount of destruction when twelve separate fires 
destroyed five buildings in the area.  While some in the community had begun to 
speculate as to the motivation of these acts of arson, the police did not.  Over the course 
of the five days in which arrests were made throughout the area, over twenty youths were 
arrested on charges of arson, or similar conspiracy charges.  While a local arrest also 
occurred that night for a “serious assault of a white person,” that, in fact, turned out to be 
a Portland firefighter, there were no large-scale arrests or major breakouts of violence 
like those that had occurred over the previous evenings.  In keeping their agreement, 
moreover, not only did Portland police officers only enter the area to assist with the 
extinguishing of the fires, but, more impressively, recorded a night of patrol without the 
use of any firearms.
45
 
In spite of this, Portland city authorities remained concerned by the outward 
defiance of militant blacks towards community advocates for peace and non-violence.  
Having met with representatives from the multiracial Urban Coalition on Wednesday, 
less than twenty-four hours after their initial agreement, McNamara could sense the 
group‟s frustrations.  Ed Mitchell, a member of the group and the coordinator of 
community services for the Model School Program, continued to lobby for additional 
time.  “We didn‟t have enough time to get to everybody about the moratorium,” Mitchell 
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conceded, before implying that a second effort would prove more fruitful.  Pointing to the 
combined efforts by both the police force and the black community on Tuesday night, 
Mitchell attempted to persuade McNamara and Taylor to hold off on the increase in 
police officers they were planning for that evening.  Fire Chief James Riopelle, in 
substantiating Mitchell‟s claims, spoke of a “substantial amount of help” given to his men 
by African-American adults in the community who kept spectators behind fire lines and 
prohibited trouble makers from causing additional conflict.
46
 
While McNamara listened to the arguments of Mitchell sympathetically, he did 
not back off his initial plans for an increase in officer levels.  Overruling the wishes of 
Fire Commissioner Stanley Earl, who, frustrated by the harassment of his firefighters, the 
dangers they faced the previous nights, and their own exhaustion after two full nights of 
work, advocated for a curfew in Albina, McNamara chose to triple the number of officers 
who would be present in the vicinity on Wednesday night.  Arguing that the incremental 
reduction in the number of officers in the neighborhood over the previous three nights 
had not been successful, McNamara stated that the additional reserve officers brought 
into the district would “meet sternness with sternness.”  While disappointed with 
McNamara‟s decision not to implement a curfew, Fire Commissioner Earl remained 
gratified by the decision to triple the police presence.  “It is my honest belief that 99 
percent of the black citizens want law enforcement, and they are entitled to protection,” 
Earl asserted.  “The time has come to enforce the laws equally.  The City of Portland is 
not open to negotiation with a bunch of hoods.”
47
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Mayor Schrunk also echoed the sentiments expressed by Fire Commissioner Earl 
upon his return, when he reinforced the city government‟s mantra that violence of any 
kind in Portland must be stopped.  Believing the disturbances to be the product of a small 
minority of actors, both black and white, Schrunk emphasized that it was likely that “90 
% of the residents of Albina” wanted no part of the activities occurring in the area.  At 
the same time, the mayor voiced his support for Tuesday night‟s withdrawal of police 
officers from Albina, stating that the plan was worthwhile, despite its perceived failure, 
because it fostered ownership of the community by its inhabitants.  “You‟ve got to give 
citizens of the area an opportunity to take responsibility and become involved in solving 
problems,” Schrunk said.  However, if buy-in by the community was unsuccessful, 
Schrunk added, such areas would necessitate a permanent doubling or tripling of police.
48
 
As McNamara and Earl spent much of that Wednesday jockeying over the 
protections necessary for Albina, Governor Tom McCall, responding to complaints from 
black residents concerning the behavior of Portland‟s police department, reaffirmed his 
defense of local law enforcement.  McCall promised police protection to all Portland 
citizens under in all circumstances and asserted that violence of any kind would be 
punished.  “Under no circumstances can we condone violence on the part of adults or 
youth, black or white,” he stated.  McCall specifically responded to requests by local 
activists that he take control of the city police.  “I have read in the press that certain black 
militants have stated that they are going to meet with me with the request that I assume 
control in the city of Portland,” McCall told the press.  Acknowledging that his “Open 
Door Policy” was widely known throughout the state and often adhered to for the benefit 
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of constituents, the governor declared he would not honor such a policy for a group of 
people who proposed violent solutions.  “I do not intend to meet with them nor do 
anything to imply support of their position,” he emphasized.  Yet McCall did concede 
that police brutality might have taken place, that there may have been “isolated incidents 
where city police officers responded too vigorously to a situation,” although he was 
careful to characterize such behavior as aberrations, rather than the norm.  The police, in 
McCall‟s final assessment, had “exercised restraint and conducted themselves in proper 
fashion.”
49
   
 While political leaders and police officials pledged to defend Albina property 
holders from violence, several local business owners signaled their intention to close their 
doors before moving out of the area or retiring.  Others determined to protect their 
property from vandalism by arming themselves.  “If they try to set fire to my place, I‟m 
going to shoot a couple of them,” stated a black Union Avenue store owner.  Another 
resident spoke similarly.  “I have my shotgun and it‟s loaded,” he told the Oregonian.  
Such revelations, while impossible to verify by the police, prompted a stern reminder by 
Police Chief McNamara that while using a firearm to defend property in the event of such 
a conflict was legal, “Persons who use force will be hold severely accountable for any 
error in judgment.”
50
  Should trouble in and around Albina on Wednesday night once 
again reach a level that the police could no longer contain, warned McNamara, a curfew 
would have to be imposed upon the entire city, to be enforced, if necessary, by the 
National Guard.
51
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As police, local officials, and Albina residents prepared for the potential for 
additional conflict on Wednesday night, it was apparent by early evening that their fears 
would not manifest.  The likely result of cooler temperatures, the voluntary and early 
closing of many area businesses, including Lidio‟s, and a significant reduction in the 
number of patrolling police officers, had resulted in deserted streets and relative calm.  
Citizen committees, made up predominantly of black citizens of the Albina community, 
moreover, sought to suppress additional disturbances from breaking out.
52
  
Despite this, black militants Kent Ford and Ralph Allen Stephenson were arrested 
on secret indictments charging them with felony assault in connection with the initial 
altercation at Lidio‟s Drive-In.  Ford, who had initially gone to the police station to bail 
out a friend, was detained after officers recognized and searched him, finding ten long 
rifle shells in his pocket.
53
 Shortly after the arrests of Ford and Stephenson, officers in the 
same general area encountered rifle fire near a vacant lot while attempting to arrest two 
other black militants, including R.L. Anderson, on charges of conspiracy to commit 
arson.
54
  Nearly three hours later, around 11:00 p.m., as a comparative peace had settled 
over the Albina area, around forty demonstrators, all of whom were white and of 
approximate college-age, protested the previous days‟ arrests by marching in and around 
both City Hall and the police station.  Carrying signs supporting “Black America” and 
referring to the police as “pigs,” the protestors carried out their action unbothered by the 
lone policeman watching them.
55
 
The difficulties encountered by the police during the Anderson arrest, as well as 
the late-night protests at the police station, served as two minor aberrations in what had 
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been the first violence-and-conflict free day out of the last five.  In comparison to the 
previous evening, when nearly twenty fire alarms had been reported, only three fire calls 
were made between midnight and 7:00 a.m. Thursday.  For the first time in a week, none 
of them originated from Albina.
56
   
As Thursday came and went peacefully and without incident, the mood of the 
community seemed to shift from one of concern to reflection.  Yet the police department, 
for the second time in two years, found itself as the prime target of many critics in the 
African American community.  Local residents such as Jimmy “Bang Bang” Walker, 
who had been hospitalized as a result of injuries incurred during the disturbances, spoke 
bluntly on the issue of police brutality.  While acknowledging that the entirety of 
Portland‟s police department could not be blamed for the racist behavior of a few, Walker 
asserted that it was imperative that Portland hire and retain officers who were not 
“bigoted, angry, or afraid.”  Walker conceded that local blacks could not, as some had 
begun to do, condone either the burning or looting of buildings that had taken place, 
stating that any individuals that had taken part in such behavior should face the 
consequences for their actions just as he expected the errant police officers to do.  
“Keeping cool is something that applies to the police as well as the black people,” Walker 
stated, cautioning that police violence in which innocent civilians were injured without 
cause would further validate the arguments furthered by the most extreme elements of the 
community.
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Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the disturbance of 1969, representatives of the Albina 
community‟s clergy, while not in uniform agreement, used their positions to publicly 
reflect on the week‟s events.  Reverend Mel Stead, the white pastor of Immaculate Heart 
Church, agreed with Jimmy Walker‟s assessment that the police had, on numerous 
occasions, overreacted in response to perceived threats.  Others, such as Lee Stone, the 
African-American pastor at St. Philip‟s Episcopal Church, saw the uprisings as part of a 
larger context of changing race relations throughout the city and country.  In a speech to 
an audience of 150 at the Downtown Kiwanis Club nearly a week after the start of the 
unrest, Stone acknowledged the presence of poorly trained and overly aggressive police 
officers but did not blame the recent racial strife on the “square pegs” that were found in 
every profession.  Instead, he asserted that the displeasure and anger in the black 
community was a “manifestation of the search by Negroes for dignity and worth in their 
contributions to American life.”  Arguing that “festering sores” of powerlessness, hatred, 
and alienation often precipitated the outbreaks that occurred in the Albina district, Stone 
urged local Portland business leaders, both white and black, to acknowledge such realities 
and to deal fairly with black customers.
1
 
Whatever the position of law enforcement officials, local government leaders, 
Albina residents, and members of the press, the primary blame for the Albina 
disturbances of 1969 could not be easily determined.  While the police ultimately 
acknowledged specific instances of over-aggressive behavior during that week of 
conflict, no officer ever admitted to any overt or targeted surveillance of Portland‟s black 
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activists.  Although large numbers of African-American residents of Albina, as well as a 
few whites, were arrested for their actions and conduct over those five days of turmoil, 
moreover, no evidence ever surfaced that covert efforts of subversion were the primary 
goal for the local radicals at the center of the conflict.  An Oregon Journal editorial, 
reflecting upon the disturbances a week later, spoke to this enigma.  “Where justice lies 
in the recent violence between Portland police and relatively small groups of young 
Negroes is impossible fully to determine,” the newspaper concluded.
2
 
What had become obvious, however, was the rift that had developed between 
elements of Albina‟s youth and members of the black business community.  In the wake 
of the disturbances, an unwritten law among many underwriters encouraged a refusal to 
renew or write new insurance policies for many segments of the Albina area.  Such 
restrictions left many long-term residents and business owners displeased with the 
behavior of the area‟s younger blacks, particularly when they scared away real estate 
investment and perpetuated the deterioration of the area‟s housing market.  Albina, 
according to one historian, was left to “predatory lenders, speculators, and absentee 
landlords” who profited from their own indifference to the rising dilapidation and 
abandonment of area homes.  The emergence of white flight, as well as an epidemic of 
home abandonment throughout the neighborhood, stood as the backdrop for the 
community through the 1970s and into the 1980s.
3
  
Other community groups, once seen explicitly as advocates of the area youth they 
served, also began to find themselves encountering resistance.  As the rhetoric and 
behavior of Portland‟s black radicals became increasingly more aggressive, the 
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neighborhood‟s clergy, social workers, and area professionals, most of whom were 
committed to incremental approaches to racial equality, found themselves struggling to 
maintain credibility as intermediaries between black youth and city leaders.  Labeled 
“Uncle Toms” if they spoke out in opposition or attempted to suppress the most radical 
statements and behavior of their peers, the groups took on a passivity that did not exist in 
earlier years.  While submissiveness to the rhetorical extremism in the black community 
earned these groups additional legitimacy within Albina, such compliance eroded their 
standing with city leaders and government officials who had long seen such groups as 
credible allies in the fight for racial equality. 
Members of Albina‟s clergy, often seen as too moderate and accommodating by 
younger parishioners, found themselves forced to assimilate to the changing culture of 
the community in order to remain relevant.  Religious leaders who refused to modify 
their moderate positions on civil rights tended to find themselves marginalized and 
without influence.  St. Mark‟s Baptist Church Reverand Edward Wilder spoke of this 
problem in a sermon in 1968 by suggesting that any church message on the struggle for 
equality that focused on approaching life in a positive manner was fruitless.  It was with 
such an approach, Wilder concluded, that the church had lost its hold over young people.
4
   
With the reorganization of the Albina Ministerial Alliance in 1970 under the leadership 
of Reverend John H. Jackson, however, the religious leaders of the area formally tied 
together concepts of religion and social action in a better effort to address both the 
economic and social inequalities within the neighborhood.   
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Other groups and institutions in Portland such as the Society for a New Action 
Politics (SNAP), the Black Panthers, the Oregon Black Caucus, the Black Education 
Center, and the Fred Hampton Free Health Clinic directly challenged the gradualist 
rhetoric and approach of traditional civil rights organizations such as the Urban League 
and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and their 
moderate black constituencies.  By 1972, moreover, the culture of Oregon‟s racial 
activism had changed so drastically that the NAACP, disgusted by the Caucus‟s decision 
to refuse white sympathizers admittance into the conference, refused to even send a 
delegate to the statewide meeting of the Oregon Black Caucus.
5
 
At odds ideologically over both the ends and means of black activism, the 
fractured civil rights movement in the city found little consensus moving forward.  
Incensed by his own arrest by police during the 1969 disturbance, Kent Ford declared the 
official formation of the Portland chapter of the Black Panther Party while standing on 
the front steps of the police station following his release.  While Northwest cities such as 
Portland and Seattle had seen an increase in activism by radical black organizations in the 
late 1960s, Ford‟s declaration marked a new chapter in Portland race relations.  In the 
following decade, and despite low membership numbers, the Panthers worked to address 
many of the concerns that had served as the impetus for their formation.  The 
organization established free breakfast programs for Albina‟s impoverished and 
economically disadvantaged children and worked to provide health and dental care for 
residents at no cost.  Cognizant of an increasingly negative national perception of the 
Black Panther Party as purveyors of revolutionary violence by the early 1970s, Portland‟s 
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chapter assumed a more moderate public stance when out in the community.  “We never 
did openly display our weapons,” stated Percy Hampton.  “We didn‟t want anyone to 
perceive us as being out-of-control, gun-toting radicals.”
6
   
Despite such efforts, however, the Panthers still failed to win over many of the 
community‟s moderate political and business leaders.  The bombing of a N.E. Union 
Avenue McDonald‟s in 1970 was blamed on the Panthers despite a lack of evidence 
connecting the group to the explosion, while other assertions, aided by the local press, 
argued that the Panthers were involved in the extortion of community businesses and 
organizations that failed to donate money to their causes.  While members of the BPP 
continually denied such accusations, quotes by Kent Ford in the fall of 1971 to the effect 
that anyone who attempted to “mess” with Panther programs would “meet their maker” 
contributed to the antagonism many moderate blacks and whites felt towards the group.
7
 
This inflammation of rhetoric surrounding the struggle for black equality 
highlighted the schism between the perception of ideological purity among black radicals 
and the pragmatic social realities facing citizens and lawmakers.  In Portland, the 
disturbances of 1967 and 1969, as well as the emergence of black radicals such as the 
Panthers in their wake, elucidated this contradiction between the ideological posturing 
necessary among these groups and the actual needs of the community that failed to be 
addressed as a result of such ideological extremism.  While many of Portland‟s radicals 
saw the disturbances of the late-1960s as necessary to the growth of Black Nationalist 
ideology, the disturbances, and the subsequent epidemic of arson in the area in the 
following years, had a devastating economic and psychological impact on the district 
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itself.  Of the 200 businesses that had composed Albina‟s main commercial drag in 1967, 
nearly 30 percent, citing their own fears of safety and violence, had either closed or 
moved out of the area by October of 1970, leaving the neighborhood further depressed 
and exhibiting the look of a ghetto. Furthermore, the constant presence of fear among 
many residents was now directed at the neighborhood‟s most radical members, as 
opposed to the police.  The elderly were “half out of their mind,” stated one observer, 
while Albina citizens, both black and white, were “absolutely terrified” of the area‟s 
younger “troublemakers.”
8
  Such experiences provide the context for understanding the 
cyclical nature of the problems faced by Albina‟s residents.  While distrustful of a police 
force and city leadership that had often ignored their concerns, many residents also came 
to understand that the ideological hyperbole encompassed in the rhetorical posturing of 
groups such as the Black Panther Party delivered just as much pain as promise. 
Regardless of the Panthers‟ controversial reputation, it was Kent Ford‟s nine-day 
trial in February 1970 that highlighted charges the group raised over police accountability 
in Portland.  Arrested during the disturbances the previous June on charges of 
participating in a riot, Ford was ultimately acquitted.  Determined, however, not to let the 
behavior of his accusers go unpunished, Ford‟s attorney filed a civil rights suit in federal 
court alleging that the plaintiff‟s rights had been violated when he was beaten and 
handcuffed by police on the night of his arrest.  Six months after he had been acquitted of 
his riot charge, Ford was awarded a total of $6,000 in damages, prompting the judge in 
the case to comment that it was time “the community realizes that the police are not free 
to inflict punishment.”
9
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 The post-disturbance landscape of Albina also brought changes to area education.  
The 1968 decision by Portland Public Schools (PPS) to combat neighborhood de facto 
segregation by busing Albina area students to suburban schools had seriously divided the 
community.  The original strategy centered on the desire to desegregate community 
schools and suppress the underlying causes of future disturbances yet many African-
American parents grew to disdain placing their children in superior schools outside their 
neighborhood through the day, only to have them come back to the problems of the 
community each night.  W.G. Hardy, a Portland native who lived through Portland‟s 
busing efforts in the late-60s, saw the event as traumatic for both whites and blacks.  
“The adults had no idea how traumatic it was for children to integrate into a culture to 
navigate through that, to develop relationships and then be torn apart,” subsequently 
reminisced.
10
  
Aware of such displeasure, PPS hired Superintendant Robert Blanchard who, in 
an effort to reverse the current efforts at desegregation, began the “Portland Schools for 
the Seventies” campaign.
11
  While encompassing a variety of approaches aimed at school 
desegregation including, but not limited to, the redrawing of attendance boundaries and 
the establishment of Early Childhood Education Centers (ECEC) aimed at attracting 
white students to the Albina neighborhood, it was Blanchard‟s attempt to accelerate 
Portland‟s busing efforts that caused the greatest controversy.  By 1975, two-thirds of all 
of the students bused in Portland had been African-American.
12
  Moreover, nearly 22% 
(2,346) of Portland‟s black population participated in the busing program in 1975, while 
only 484 white students were involved during the same year.
13
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The inequalities between African-American students and their white counterparts 
built into the “Schools for the Seventies” campaign served as the catalyst for a series of 
subsequent educational reform efforts.  In 1977, the Community Coalition for School 
Integration (CCSI), which included representatives from groups as diverse as the 
NAACP, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), and the Metropolitan Human 
Rights Commission (MHRC), thoroughly investigated previous efforts at public school 
desegregation in Portland. The coalition ultimately offered up thirty-five pages of 
recommendations, including a more equitable way to distribute busing among white and 
African-American students.
14
 Beginning in 1979, moreover, Portland‟s branch of the 
Black United Front (BUF) began an assault on the city school board to force change on 
the “Schools for the Seventies” plan.  While advocating a variety of positions 
sympathetic to keeping Northeast Portland middle and high schools open, it was the 
BUF‟s targeting of busing for elimination that rallied supporters to their cause.  Often 
confrontational, the power of the BUF was undeniable.  When four school board 
members left their posts between 1978 and 1980, all four of their replacements were 
sympathetic to BUF causes.
15
 
As the Black United Front continued to play a role in bringing more diversity to 
education in Portland, other efforts at fostering educational multiculturalism were taking 
center stage.  Adopted in 1980 by PPS, an agreement known as the Comprehensive 
Desegregation Plan (CDP) stipulated that future school boards must create “an excellent 
multicultural/multiethnic education for all children.”
16
  Out of this mandate grew a 
variety of efforts meant to remedy these perceived inequities.  Meant to supplement and 
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enhance existing curriculum, documents such as the African-American Baseline Essays 
became a part of PPS curriculum beginning in 1987 with the aim of creating a more 
multicultural and diverse learning experience.  By 2001, Baseline Essays for Asian 
Americans had also become a part of the PPS curriculum.
17
 
The adversarial relationship between much of Portland‟s African-American 
community and the police, while not entirely absent in the following decades, did not 
suffer from the same bitterness that had been directed towards the Albina police officers 
that had patrolled the neighborhood decades earlier.  While Portland‟s police force, in its 
entirety, in the 1960s, could not fairly be described as racially bigoted, it is undeniable 
that large numbers of the force harbored racial prejudices that dictated their conduct in 
policing Albina.  In fact, a 1966 survey of Portland‟s rank-and-file police officers 
determined that nearly 90 percent of all officers felt that the civil rights movement was 
had progressed too quickly, while just over half believed that racial equality was moving 
too rapidly.
18
 
In September of 1969, having been denied legal equality by the city‟s law 
enforcement officials, a class action lawsuit on behalf of more than twenty thousand 
black Portlanders was brought to the U.S. District Court.  Listing Mayor Terry Schrunk, 
Chief of Police Donald McNamara, the city council, and thirty-eight Portland police 
officers, the suit asked the court to end the institutionalized and organized discrimination 
of black residents by the police force in the form of harassment, illegal searches, and 
unjustified arrests.  Stating that the police behavior forced the black community to “live 
in an atmosphere of fear and persecution,” the complainants asked the judge to rule 
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against the defendants to prohibit any future harassment.  A final ruling, handed down in 
June of 1971 and referred to as the “Probasco Decree,” named so because of the main 
complainant Robert Probasco, dictated that while the police bureau did not have to admit 
to any specific wrongdoing, it was prohibited from engaging in any of the alleged abusive 
behavior listed in the suit in any future interactions.   
But while the Probasco Decree placed specific restraints physical and verbal 
abuse by police officers, the reforms were still challenged daily by individual officers 
acting independently and in violation of the law.  While incidents in the ensuing decades 
involving prejudiced and racially intolerant police officers continued to undermine the 
police‟s ability to repair their relationship with the black community, the simmering 
hostilities that once existed between the groups has receded significantly.  Furthermore, 
yearly efforts by the Portland Police Bureau to monitor minority arrest records, improve 
relationships with city youth, and participate in community outreach efforts reflect a self-
awareness non-existent in the late 1960s.  
In the decades following the Albina disturbances of the late-1960s, Portland still 
continued to struggle with the core economic issues that precipitated the initial conflict.  
Area real estate, which had been considered some of the worst in the city for nearly four 
decades, only recently became coveted property.  Desired predominantly by white 
investors and homeowners, the area‟s new affluence has created a problem many never 
foresaw: many of the homes in the Albina neighborhood have become unaffordable to the 
area‟s African-Americans.  Journalist Jacob Q. Sanders, writing reflectively on the 
neighborhood in a 2005 Portland Tribune article, wrote that nearly forty years after the 
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disturbances, a Black resident of the newly gentrified Boise neighborhood claimed that 
“„a generation of black people‟ had grown up hearing the tale from their parents and 
grandparents of the „wicked White people who took away their neighborhoods.‟”
19
   
Recent scholarship on this topic by Leanne Serbulo and Karen Gibson argues that 
Albina, as a result of years of residential segregation and racial isolation, began to view 
itself, much like other urban areas of the country, as an internal colony that had become 
“dependent on outsiders for political economic resources and subject to the authority of 
white-dominated institutions such as the school district, police, and welfare bureaucracy.”  
Connecting the experiences of Portland‟s African-Americans to those of other northern 
cities experiencing heightened racial turmoil, the authors saw the behavior of the police 
as part of a “colonization process” that “ghettoized black citizens” and created an 
economic and political dependency that eroded the community.
20
  
In support of their theory, Gibson and Serbulo make a compelling case.  The 
authors cite a devastating conversation in which Mayor Terry Schrunk, confronted with 
requests by Albina residents to provide additional police officers to the neighborhood as a 
result of the increasing drug trade, casually asserts that the confinement of the drugs in 
Albina, to the exclusion of the rest of the city, did not merit greater law enforcement.  
The authors detail police surveillance efforts in the black community, cite statistics to 
demonstrate the paucity of black police officers and politicians in the city, and bring to 
light the efforts of FBI agents to infiltrate and discredit individuals associated with black 
nationalist movements.  Moreover, Gibson and Serbulo provide numerous accounts of 
sabotage by members of the police department when they were directed to implement 
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reforms.
21
 Such actions, as embodied by the police bureau, can only be seen as part of an 
effort to protect a racial status quo and stifle racial equality. Consequently, many of 
Albina‟s black youths, frustrated by dwindling economic opportunities, inequalities in 
education, and frequent police harassment, and motivated by the emergence of Black 
Nationalist rhetoric, viewed the police as the symbol of racial oppression. 
But while the actions and behavior of city politicians and law enforcement 
officials cited in Gibson and Serbulow‟s article indicate the prevalence of systematic and 
widespread racial discrimination, their argument that Albina fits the characteristics of the 
colonial model can be disputed.  While the assertion by the authors that “black citizens 
saw police officers as representatives of a state that had delegated „the legitimate use of 
violence to police authority‟ in the interest of subordination,” is accurate in many 
respects, it is also true that a monolithic view of the police among African-Americans did 
not exist.
22
  As argued in earlier chapters of this thesis, many older Albina residents, 
displeased with the increase in the amount of vandalism and violence in the 
neighborhood, saw the police as allies, as opposed to oppressors.  Having established 
their families in the neighborhood over previous decades, many older residents saw the 
police as necessary to protect their homes and businesses in an increasingly dangerous 
neighborhood.   
Gibson and Serbulo supplement their colonial model by asserting that the 
“colonial framework challenged liberalism because it argued for the redistribution of 
power and institutional control, rather than assimilation and integration into existing 
institutions through practices such as school busing and affirmative action.”
23
 While civil 
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rights activists in Portland did work to create levers of institutional change to redefine 
fundamental aspects of society (the commitment of the Black Panthers to providing free 
social and medical services to the underprivileged; and the efforts of the Black United 
Front to reshape public education in the early-1980s), they also worked incrementally on 
issues of employment, education, and police-community relations in ways that can only 
be described as integrationist.  Remedies such as busing, along with numerous other 
efforts, were often the assimilationist tactics used to try to bring about the desired goal of 
greater racial equality. Rather than immediately attempting to seize control of 
institutions, as is stated in the colonial framework, most advocates of racial equality 
simply sought to gain improvements in areas of employment and education.  Not only 
had racial integration been the goal for most Portland African-Americans, but it had stood 
as the foundation of the civil rights strategy of local organizations such as the Urban 
League and the NAACP since their inception.  
Statistically speaking, the modern Albina district no longer possesses a monopoly 
on Portland‟s African-American population.  Between the years 2000 and 2010, nearly 
10,000 African-Americans, pushed out of the area as a result of gentrification, left the 
city for cheaper housing on the eastern edges of Portland.
24
 “We anticipated 
gentrification and welcomed it to a degree,” says Carl Talton, cofounder of the 
North/Northeast Economic Development Alliance. “What we didn‟t anticipate was that 
we wouldn‟t be able to manage it and that it would just run away.”
25
  While the number 
of African-Americans decreased in the city‟s inner east side between 2000 and 2010, the 
inner north and northeast areas experienced the greatest racial change with nearly 7,700 
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African-Americans moving out.
26
  In this same area of time, neighborhood tracts east of 
82
nd
 street saw an increase in nearly 9,300 black residents, most of whom had migrated 
from the inner east side of the city.
27
 While still home to the greatest concentration of the 
city‟s African-Americans, which now make up nearly 7 percent of the city‟s total 
population, young and affluent whites have gentrified this section of Albina, creating 
newer and more expensive real estate.
28
 “The exodus from the central city causes me 
great concern; it is alarming,” stated Portland Mayor Sam Adams in 2011.  “Whether you 
are a Portlander of color or a white Portlander, you should care about the fact that we 
offer such limited access to equal opportunities.”
29
  The mayor‟s statement, nearly forty 
years after disturbances erupted in Albina, reflected the modern incarnation of a 
sentiment first expressed by a black resident of the neighborhood in 1967:  
“Albina might have been just a section of the city with no name,” the resident 
asserted.  “But when Negro families start moving in – it‟s „Albina‟.”
30
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Appendix A: Map of the Albina Neighborhood (1970) 
Portland, Oregon’s Albina District neighborhoods 
